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Commodification and Contract Formation:
Placing the Consideration Doctrine
on Stronger Foundations
David Gamaget & Allon Kedemtt
Under the traditional consideration doctrine, a promise is only legally enforceable if it is
made in exchange for something of value. This doctrine lies at the heart of contract law, yet it lacks
a sound theoretical justification -a fact that has confounded generations of scholars and created a
mess of case law.
This Article argues that the failure of traditional justifications for the doctrine comes from
two mistaken assumptions. First, previous scholars have assumed that anyone can back a promise
with nominal consideration if they wish to do so. We show how social norms against commodifica-
tion limit the availability of the consideration form. Some promises are made in social contexts in
which invoking consideration-that is, exchanging a promise for something of value-violates
social taboos. Specifically, we show that anticommodification taboos operate where the social
message sent by a transaction is more important than the desire to transfer goods or services.
Whereas previous scholarship has assumed one can always invoke consideration, we argue that
anticommodification norms make even nominal consideration unavailable within these contexts
Second, scholars have assumed that when parties utilize a formalism -such as nominal con-
sideration -to make their promises legally binding, they necessarily desire to be bound. Using a
game theory model based on asymmetric information, we dispute the conventional wisdom that the
law should honor parties' intentions as articulated at the time of contract formation. We show how
parties' expressed intentions may not conform to their underlying desires A promisor may render
her promise legally enforceable-even though she does not want to-in order to signal her sincer-
ity to the promisee. As a result, in a cycle of inefficient signaling, other promisors may feel forced to
do the same. Thus, the mere fact that parties take advantage of a legally binding form does not
imply that they desire the existence of that option. Having the option to legally enforce a promise
may harm both promisors and promisees
Having exposed these two flawed assumptions; we provide a new framework for determin-
ing which promises the law should enforce. Ultimately, what matters is not whether the parties
actually do invoke consideration, but rather whether they can invoke consideration. Norms prevent
parties from invoking consideration where the social message sent by a promise is more important
than the substance of the transaction-and these are precisely the types of promises in which ineffi-
cient signaling is likely to occur. In other words, norms block the use of consideration precisely
where the option for legal enforcement of promises is most likely to harm both promisors and
promisees Therefore, only when social norms allow the use of consideration should we conclude
that parties truly desire the option to have their promises legally enforced.
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it Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Pierre N. Leval, United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit. The authors would like to thank Daniel Markovits, Ian Ayres, Bernie Black, Larry
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INTRODUCTION
People make promises all the time. In the course of a day, we
might promise a spouse to complete household chores, a coworker to
finish a project by its deadline, and a service provider to pay for a ser-
vice upon completion. Yet only the last of these promises will gener-
ally impose a legal obligation. Whereas the first two statements are
mere unilateral promises, the fact that the third promise is exchanged
for something of value-the service-makes it a contract that can be
enforced in courts of law.
This rule is known as the consideration doctrine: the law will not
enforce unilateral promises, but promises exchanged for something of
value become legally binding contracts. There are many exceptions to
this doctrine. Other rules can make a promise legally binding, and not
all promises backed by consideration are legally enforceable. Neverthe-
less, the consideration doctrine remains the most important rule for
distinguishing between unenforceable promises and contracts backed
by law.
Unfortunately, we lack a sound theoretical justification for the
consideration doctrine.' Underlying most of contract law is the general
principle that parties' intentions should be honored So why, then, do
we refuse enforcement to even those unilateral promises that were
clearly intended to be binding?
Existing attempts to justify the consideration doctrine fall into
two general camps. First, formalist scholars defend the doctrine as a
mechanism for determining parties' intentions. By creating a hoop the
parties must jump through in order to make their promises binding,
the law creates a mechanism for parties to convey which promises
they intend to impose legal obligations. In order to make their prom-
ises legally enforceable, the parties need only claim that their promise
is being exchanged for something of value. In other words, they need
only recite consideration. Yet as Eric Posner explains,
[T]here is no reason to require parties to recite a consideration as
opposed to reciting that they want their [promise] to be enforce-
able .... Efforts to rationalize this practice as a way of ensuring
1 See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L J 1417, 1477-81 (2004)
(examining limits of the formalist theory of consideration).
2 In the words of Charles Fried, contract law rests on "the liberal principle that the free
arrangements of rational persons should be respected." Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 35
(Harvard 1981).
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that courts can distinguish enforceable and unenforceable prom-
ises fail because they do not explain the 'form' of the formality.'
No one doubts that formal mechanisms have their place within
the legal system. But formal accounts of the consideration doctrine
have failed to justify the use of consideration specifically. If the ulti-
mate goal is to determine which promises the parties intended to be
binding, why not simply require parties who desire enforcement to
declare so in writing?'
In contrast to formalist scholars, who view the consideration doc-
trine as a tool for determining when parties want their promises to be
enforced, substantive theorists see the doctrine as a means for separat-
ing unilateral promises from exchanges. Substantive accounts argue
that unilateral-or "gratuitous" -promises are less socially valuable
than promises made as part of a bilateral exchange. The substantive
approach cares not for the parties' intentions or what steps they take
to communicate a desire to be bound; only "true" exchange promises
are deemed worthy of legal enforcement.
At first glance, substantive arguments might seem to offer a valid
justification for the consideration doctrine. Yet, as we shall see, these
arguments fail to withstand sustained reflection.' Like most other schol-
ars who have reviewed the literature, we conclude that gratuitous prom-
ises are not inherently less deserving of legal support.
While academics have debated about these flawed accounts of
the consideration doctrine, courts have floundered over the doctrine's
weak theoretical foundations. Some courts have followed the formalist
approach, enforcing promises backed by even trivial amounts of con-
6
sideration, while other courts have invoked substantive principles in
striking down promises where the consideration is insignificant in
value.! The Restatement (Second) of Contracts rejects the use of
nominal consideration-consideration of minimal worth-where the
Restatement (First) had accepted it, but neither version has proved
authoritative for how courts actually decide these disputes. As current
3 Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 Yale L J 829,850-51 (2003).
4 See Part I.A for further discussion.
5 See Part I.B.
6 See, for example, Edgar v Hunt, 218 Mont 30, 706 P2d 120, 122 (1985) (holding that "a
nominal consideration of one dollar and other valuable consideration" was sufficient to support
a repurchase agreement).
7 See, for example, Scott v Scott, 86 Ark App 120, 161 SW3d 307, 311 (2004) (finding no
consideration where father gave parcel of land to daughters "even though consideration was
recited in the deeds"); Noel v Noel, 212 Kan 583,512 P2d 324, 328 (1973) (noting that considera-
tion of "[llove and affection and one dollar" is "characteristic of a gift").
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doctrine stands, there is no predictable answer to the question of how
much consideration is needed before a promise will be enforced.
This Article argues that the problematic state of the considera-
tion doctrine flows from two assumptions shared by nearly all com-
mentators. First, scholars have assumed that any parties who desire to
do so can back a promise with nominal consideration. And second,
scholars have assumed that only parties who truly want their promises
to be legally enforced will utilize a formalism-like nominal consid-
eration-to make their promises binding. As we will demonstrate,
both of these assumptions are flawed.
The first assumption claims that all parties who wish to do so can
back their promises with nominal consideration. After all, what could
possibly prevent parties from exchanging a promise for a penny in
order to make it binding? Our answer is anticommodification norms.
By its very nature, the use of consideration commodifies a prom-
ise by insisting that the promise be exchanged for something of value.
Many promises are made within relationships in which the parties are
supposed to be guided by more than just self-interest and economic
rationality. Within these relationships, a promisor who asks for some-
thing in return for her promise risks signaling that she views the rela-
tionship in instrumental terms. The consideration doctrine can only be
activated when parties agree that a promise is made as part of a bar-
gained-for exchange. But discussing promises using bargain-oriented
language and behavior may be inappropriate within certain social con-
texts. To even suggest the use of nominal consideration might under-
mine the trust upon which these relationships are built.
We examine the literature on commodification within three
branches of knowledge: (1) sociology and anthropology, (2) philoso-
phy and political theory, and (3) economics and game theory. Al-
though the literature does not enable us to determine precisely the
circumstances under which consideration will be socially unavailable,
we can still reach some broad conclusions about the nature of anti-
commodification norms. These norms apply when the message sent by
a promise is more important than the substance of the promise-that
is, where the actual transfer of the promised goods or services plays
only a secondary role.
For example, when promising to take a loved one out for her
birthday, the substance of the promise may be less important than the
message of affection it conveys. To commodify this sort of promise-
say, by asking the loved one to pay a dollar to ensure that the promise
is honored-would violate anticommodification norms. Yet for other
promises the message sent is not as important as the substance of the
pledge. A businesswoman who promises to distribute goods on time
1302 [73:1299
Commodification and Contract Formation
will not violate norms by asking for payment in return for a guarantee
of timely delivery.
Scholars have recognized the importance of anticommodification
norms for many aspects of the legal system-particularly within prop-
erty law. Yet contracts scholars have not heretofore discussed the im-
plications of these norms for the consideration doctrine. Although we
have only a tentative understanding of how these norms work in prac-
tice, one conclusion is clear: there exist circumstances in which anti-
commodification norms block the use of consideration. The assump-
tion that all parties who so wish can readily make use of nominal con-
sideration is simply wrong.
We thus have a partial answer to the formalist's dilemma. Due to
anticommodification norms, a formal rule based on nominal consid-
eration differs from other formal alternatives -such as a seal or writ-
ing requirement. But does this difference favor the use of nominal
consideration? After all, the principle of honoring parties' intentions
would seem to justify using the least restrictive legal rule. To answer
this question, we turn to the second flawed assumption made by pre-
vious commentators: the assumption that parties' expressed wishes
necessarily reflect their underlying desires.
To follow the principle that contract law should honor parties' in-
tentions, courts need to determine the content of the parties' inten-
tions. In the absence of contravening circumstances like duress, courts
typically assume that parties who invoke a legal rule for making their
promises binding actually want their promises to be legally enforced.
As adherents of the traditional accounts might ask: why would anyone
take steps to bind themselves unless they actually wanted to be
bound? Yet as we demonstrate, this logic relies on a shallow under-
standing of the nature of parties' desires.
Employing a game theory model based on asymmetric informa-
tion, we show how parties can essentially be forced into a legally bind-
ing form once that form is made available to them. Even parties who
would prefer not to be able to make their promises legally enforceable
may find it necessary to utilize a doctrine like nominal consideration
once it is put into place. Crucially, there is a difference between one's
choice when confronted with a legal rule and one's preference for
what the legal rule should be.
Consider the practice of promising. When a promisor makes her
promise legally binding she exposes herself to legal sanction if she
doesn't follow through. Through this willingness to face sanctions,
8 See generally, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 Harv L Rev
1849 (June 1987).
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promisors can signal commitment, assuring promisees of their sincer-
ity. But when only some promisors secure their promises through the
law, promisees may become suspicious of the promisors who fail to do
so-suspicious, that is, of promisors who choose not to make their
promises legally enforceable. So as not to be seen as unreliable, pro-
misors may be forced to render their promises legally binding, even if
they would have preferred to avoid the potential legal entanglement.
Thus, promisors' expressed intentions do not necessarily match
their underlying desires. Under a regime in which promisors can render
their promises legally enforceable, they may choose to do so. However,
the promisors might well wish they lived in a regime without this op-
tion. In other words, the mere fact that parties choose to employ a
legally binding form does not necessarily indicate that they desire the
option to use that form.9
Having discarded the two flawed assumptions underlying tradi-
tional accounts of the consideration doctrine, we can outline our novel
justification for the doctrine. Rejecting the first assumption tells us
that a rule based on nominal consideration differs from other formal
alternatives. Due to anticommodification norms, not all parties can
utilize nominal consideration. Rejecting the second assumption tells
us that parties who take advantage of a legal rule might not desire its
existence. Utilizing a permissive approach-such as enforcing all
promises where the parties express a desire for enforcement in writ-
ing-could end up harming both promisors and promisees.
To synthesize these two observations into our novel account of
the consideration doctrine we need one final insight: anticommodifica-
tion norms deny the option of legal enforcement to precisely those
parties who benefit from excluding that option. Social norms prevent
the parties from invoking consideration where the social message sent
by a promise is more important than the substance of the transac-
tion-and these are precisely the types of promises in which ineffi-
cient signaling is likely to occur. Conversely, where the substance of
the transaction is more important than the message sent, inefficient
signaling is unlikely to take place. Thus, where anticommodification
norms allow parties to invoke consideration, the parties should gener-
ally benefit from having the option to make their promises legally
binding. And where anticommodification norms prevent parties from
using consideration, we can expect that the parties prefer not having
an option for legal enforcement.
9 The availability of a legally binding form can harm promisees as well as promisors. There
are costs to securing a promise through the legal system. Forcing promisors to bear these costs
may lead them to reduce the magnitude of their promises, thereby reducing the value received
by promisees. See Part III.C.
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Our novel account of the consideration doctrine is formalist in na-
ture. Yet where previous formalist arguments have been unable to jus-
tify the use of consideration over alternative forms, we show that the
consideration doctrine better tracks parties' underlying desires than
many alternatives. If we allowed parties to bind themselves through an
alternative form like a writing requirement, some promisors might
feel forced to make their promises legally enforceable even when they
would prefer not to be able to do so. The consideration doctrine
avoids this result by providing an option of legal enforceability that
can only be exercised within social relationships where parties are
likely to desire the option.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the inadequa-
cies of existing theoretical accounts of the consideration doctrine and
of the manner in which the courts have applied the doctrine. The Part
is primarily intended to provide background information; readers who
are already familiar with the problematic state of the consideration
doctrine may wish to skip directly to Parts II, III, and IV, where we
develop our novel solution to the doctrine's problems.'°
In Part II, we survey the literature on anticommodification to show
how social taboos prevent some parties from backing their promises
with even nominal consideration. Part II depicts the first flawed as-
sumption made by traditional accounts of the consideration doctrine.
Even when courts enforce promises backed only by nominal considera-
tion, some parties remain unable to utilize the consideration form.
Part III explains the second flawed assumption of existing theo-
ries. The principle of honoring parties' intentions does not mean that
we should always look to parties' expressed wishes with regard to an
individual transaction. There is a difference between one's actions
when confronted by a legal rule and one's preference for what the
legal rule should be. Granting parties an option to bind themselves
can ultimately harm both promisors and promisees.
Part IV synthesizes the results from the previous two parts to
provide a novel justification for the consideration doctrine. Expanding
on our game theory analysis, we argue that anticommodification
norms only prevent the use of consideration in circumstances wherein
parties should generally prefer not to have a legally binding option
made available. Where the option for legal enforcement is beneficial,
10 This is not to suggest that Part I adds nothing to the literature. We believe our descrip-
tion of the inadequacies of existing theory and doctrine forms a better overview than other
accounts. We also add several new critiques and observations that have not yet appeared in the
literature. Nevertheless, the primary value of our Article lies in Parts II, III, and IV. We doubt
that many scholars of the consideration doctrine will be surprised with the results of our analysis
in Part I.
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anticommodification norms should not prevent parties from invoking
consideration. Hence, we would use the consideration doctrine as a
means for distinguishing not between promises, but between the social
contexts in which promises are made.
To conclude, we demonstrate how our new justification for the
consideration doctrine can help resolve the morass of existing case
law. Our account calls for strict application of the principle of nominal
consideration. All promises backed by even trivial amounts of consid-
eration should be enforced, but promises should generally not be le-
gally obligating without at least a token amount of consideration. This
rule obviates the need for the many exceptions and qualifications
plaguing current applications of the doctrine.
I. THE INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING THEORY AND PRACTICE
Despite vigorous debates about the underlying rationale for con-
tract law, most commentators accept the goal of honoring parties' in-
tentions as expressed at the time of contract formation." One school
of thought maintains that promisors should be free to commit them-
selves to a future course of action, and that enforcing a promise both
increases the promisor's liberty and demonstrates respect for her
autonomy.12 A second school of thought focuses on the promisee's rea-
sonable expectations, which will be disappointed if the promisor
breaches." Under this approach, the enforcement of promises primar-
ily serves to avoid the harms of dashed expectations. A third school of
thought emphasizes the social utility of promises, which allow pro-
misees to reorder their affairs in anticipation of performance."M Here,
legal enforcement of promises is required to ensure that promisees
can rely on promises without fear of breach. Thus, though each of the
major schools of contract theory begins with a different premise, all
11 This goal represents what Cass Sunstein has labeled as an "incompletely theorized
agreement," in that the midlevel principle that the law should honor parties' intentions as ex-
pressed at the time of contract formation is supported by multiple contradictory higher-level
justifications. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev 1733,
1735-36 (1995) ("Participants in legal controversies try to produce incompletely theorized
agreements on particular outcomes. They agree on the result and on relatively narrow or low-level
explanations for it. They need not agree on fundamental principle.").
12 See generally, for example, Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum L
Rev 269 (1986); Fried, Contract as Promise (cited in note 2).
13 See generally, for example, Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 Phil & Pub Aff
199 (1990) (discussing promising in relation to social obligations to keep promises).
14 See generally, for example, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L J 541 (2003) (analyzing the normative implications of distinc-
tions between commercial and noncommercial contracts).
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three conclude that the law should follow a promisor's stated inten-
tions at the time of promising.
Against this backdrop of respecting parties' wishes, the consid-
eration doctrine requires affirmative justification. By rendering prom-
ises unenforceable when not accompanied by appropriate recom-
pense, the consideration doctrine departs from the principle of honor-
ing parties' expressed intentions. The doctrine allows even the most
sincere of promisors to later renege with impunity when the promise
was not made as part of an exchange. No matter how unequivocally
the promisor states his intention to perform-though he may "shout
consideration to the housetops""- -the promise is a legal nullity if con-
sideration is lacking.
As discussed previously, attempts to justify the nonenforceability
of promises that lack consideration divide into two general catego-
ries-formal arguments and substantive arguments. Yet existing ar-
guments of both types have failed to provide a convincing rationale
for the consideration doctrine. Based on these flawed theoretical prin-
ciples, courts have created a mess of their attempts to apply the doc-
trine to actual cases.
A. Formal Arguments
Formal arguments emphasize not the significance of a promise,
but the form that it takes. The legal system must have some mecha-
nism for distinguishing between unenforceable promises and binding
contracts. Formal arguments discuss rationales related to the needs of
the legal system. Without a clear set of rules for limiting the promises
enforceable in law, we would risk having our everyday utterances trans-
formed into binding contracts even when we have no intention of in-
voking a legal form. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine our capi-
talist system functioning without some method for securing at least
those contracts used to facilitate market transactions. No one supports
enforcing all promises or none at all. Formal arguments seek to help
courts with the difficulties involved in drawing a line between these
two extremes.
Formal arguments thus stress the importance of a promise's out-
ward appearance. Promises that take a particular form are more wor-
thy of legal enforcement, not because they are substantively superior,
but because the form says something about the process by which the
promise came about. Because formal arguments focus on superficial
indicia, rather than on content, they often point in opposite directions
15 In re Greene, 45 F2d 428,430 (SDNY 1930).
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from substantive arguments. For instance, formalist theories usually
support enforcing promises backed by only nominal consideration,
whereas substantive accounts frequently do not.
At first glance, a formal approach to justifying the consideration
doctrine might appear to serve contract law's aim of respecting par-
ties' intentions. By outlining the conditions under which promises will
be enforced, the consideration doctrine provides parties with a blue-
print for giving legal force to their intentions. Yet the consideration
doctrine is a poor means of effectuating parties' wishes because it de-
nies enforcement to many promises where there is no question that
the promisor intended to be bound. An alternative more consistent
with the underlying goal of respecting parties' desires would be to
require only that the parties clearly declare their intentions in writ-
ing.16 As the following discussion demonstrates, a writing requirement
would be preferable to the consideration doctrine in terms of the for-
mal arguments typically offered to support it.
1. The "evidentiary" rationale.
Many formal theorists maintain that the consideration require-
ment is necessary to preserve evidence of a transaction for later judi-
cial inquiry. In the words of Richard Posner, the consideration doc-
trine "reduces the number of phony contract suits, by requiring the
plaintiff to prove more than just that someone promised him some-
thing; he must show that there was a deal of some sort-which is a
little harder to make up out of whole cloth." 7 Because donative prom-
ises are often oral, consideration is defended as a form of objective
proof to corroborate a promisee's claim.'8 Such proof allegedly serves
to reduce the likelihood that a false claim will prevail and lowers the
cost of adjudicating all claims.'9
However, to argue that legal enforcement of a promise should
only occur where a promisee can produce evidence substantiating his
16 Arguably, such a requirement would more closely track the expectations of the
nonlawyer public.
17 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 109 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
18 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U Chi L Rev 1, 5 (1979) ("[I]n a context
that involves neither formality nor explicit reciprocity, it may often be difficult to distinguish a
promise from a statement of present intent.").
19 The consideration doctrine's evidentiary function has been claimed to justify the minor-
ity rule that past moral obligation may serve as a substitute for consideration. See Richard A.
Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J Legal Stud 411, 418-19 (1977) (arguing
that the minimal cost of legal error in cases of moral obligation obviates the evidentiary need for
consideration). But see Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum L Rev 799,821 (1941)
(arguing that promises supported by moral obligation should be enforced despite the "eviden-
tiary insecurity" they generate).
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claim is not necessarily to argue in favor of a consideration require-
ment. Many possible methods of maintaining evidence exist, most no-
tably a writing requirement. In fact, the consideration doctrine is a
relatively poor way to preserve proof, since a promisee's delivery of a
nominal sum to the promisor can be easily denied -leaving the parties
in precisely the same position as if no consideration for the promise
existed. And when the consideration for one promise is another prom-
ise, as is often the case, no evidence of the transaction is preserved."°
As Andrew Kull notes, "it is difficult to think of any respect in which
[problems of proof] are necessarily exacerbated if the promise is gra-
tuitous rather than compensated."21 While the need to preserve evi-
dence may justify some sort of ritual to solemnize a transfer, the con-
sideration doctrine is a lousy candidate."
2. The "cautionary" rationale.
Another formal argument claims that the consideration doctrine
ensures that a promisor intends to be legally bound and that she does
so only after sufficient deliberation.2 By requiring an extra step-the
transfer of consideration -before rendering a promise enforceable,
the doctrine prevents promisors from hastily committing themselves
to obligations they might later regret. The ritual of consideration also
ensures that the promisor intends to be bound legally. Even a promi-
sor who fully intends to perform at the time the pledge is made may
wish not to render his promise legally enforceable. By failing to re-
ceive consideration in return for the promise, the promisor can ensure
that the legal system will not become involved in the event of breach.
As to the former justification, the prevention of hasty promises,
one might wonder whether the consideration doctrine is overkill. As
Kull notes, "Such cases are easy to imagine but hard to find in the re-
ports."2 In any event, there is little reason to believe that rash dona-
20 See James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue about the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 Cornell L
Rev 987,991 (1990).
21 Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J Legal Stud 39,53 (1992).
22 Moreover, the statute of frauds already requires that substantial promises be recorded in
writing, so that problems of proof will only exist, if at all, for relatively minor donative promises.
See Gordon, 75 Cornell L Rev at 990-91 (cited in note 20) (discussing the evidentiary limits of
consideration).
23 This Section discusses what Fuller called the "channeling" function of consideration in
addition to what he labels as the "cautionary" function. See Fuller, 41 Colum L Rev at 800-04
(cited in note 19).
24 Kull, 21 J Legal Stud at 46 (cited in note 21).
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tive promises are any more common than rash purchases5 Yet the law
does not control for deliberation in the bargain context, even though a
poorly thought-out bargain might prove ruinous to one or both parties
"because the law does not really care about deliberation." However,
even if the deterrence of hasty donative promises is important, the
consideration doctrine is hardly an inevitable choice. Any formal en-
forceability requirement- that the promisor stand on his head and
count backwards from twelve, for instance- would serve the same
purpose.27 And any formality would similarly ensure that the promisor
intended to be bound.
Neither evidentiary nor cautionary arguments can justify the con-
sideration doctrine. However worthwhile the desire to preserve evi-
dence for future dispute resolutions or to guarantee that donative
promises are made carefully and with the intention to be bound, a
consideration requirement is no better than other formalities. Indeed,
the transfer of a dollar is a far shoddier means of preserving proof
than a requirement that donative promises be made in writing. Thus,
formal arguments for the consideration doctrine cannot "explain the
'form' of the formality."28 Although we clearly need some mechanism
for distinguishing binding contracts from empty statements, existing
formal accounts do not show why the consideration doctrine best
serves this role. To the extent we believe in the principle of honoring
parties' intentions, we should instead enforce all promises where the
promisor clearly declares that she wishes to be bound.
B. Substantive Arguments
Where formal arguments look to the needs of the legal system,
substantive arguments examine the content of promises. Some sub-
stantive theorists claim that the consideration doctrine serves to dis-
tinguish between socially valuable exchanges and socially worthless
gifts, enforcing the former but not the latter. Others maintain that do-
native promises should not be enforced because the costs of enforce-
ment outweigh the benefits. Substantive accounts do not deny that as
a general rule we should enforce promises when the parties desire it.
Instead, substantive accounts try to show how this wisdom does not
apply to a subset of promises that do not merit enforcement. Substan-
tive arguments thus run directly counter to the idea that contract law
25 It is, perhaps, not coincidental that the term "buyer's remorse" exists but that "donor's
remorse" does not-though one might argue, however implausibly, that the existence of the
consideration doctrine is responsible for suppressing the supply of remorseful donors.
26 Kull, 21 J Legal Stud at 54 (cited in note 21).
27 See Gordon, 75 Cornell L Rev at 991 (cited in note 20).
28 E. Posner, 112 Yale L J at 850 (cited in note 3).
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should respect parties' intentions in all cases. No matter how strongly
the parties wish to be bound, no matter what hoops they are willing to
jump through to render their intentions enforceable, a substantive
approach would deny enforcement to promises not made as part of an
exchange. Yet existing substantive arguments for the consideration
doctrine ultimately prove unpersuasive.
1. The "sterile" rationale.
A common defense of the consideration doctrine argues that
promises lacking in consideration are less socially useful than prom-
ises exchanged for something of value. Whereas exchanges enhance
overall social wealth, donative transfers merely redistribute it. Charac-
terizations of donative promises as economically "sterile" have a long
pedigree. Quoting the 1884 lectures of Claude Bufnoir in his famous
article, Consideration and Form, Lon Fuller opined that "[w]hile an
exchange of goods is a transaction which conduces to the production of
wealth and the division of labor, a gift is, in Bufnoir's words, a 'sterile
transmission.' 29 And this description persists in the literature today.' °
Yet despite the influence of the notion that donative promises are
economically sterile, its validity is highly questionable. As a prelimi-
nary matter, donative transfers may themselves be welfare enhancing:
if the donee values a gift more than the donor, then the transfer en-
hances social utility. As Melvin Eisenberg explains, "[G]ifts have a
wealth-redistribution effect, and taken as a class probably redistribute
wealth to persons who have more utility for money than the donors.31
Some economists have claimed that giftgiving is inefficient, be-
cause--barring wealth effects-if a donee had valued the gift at more
than its cost, then the donee would have already purchased it for him-
self. That the donee did not purchase the item for himself suggests that
he values it at less than its price. But there are several reasons to
doubt this claim. First, the value a donee places on an item may in-
crease by virtue of the fact that the item is given as a gift. Many are
those who would walk by a flower stand without buying anything but
would be thrilled to receive a dozen roses from a loved one. The giving
29 Fuller, 41 Colum L Rev at 815 (cited in note 19), quoting Claude Bufnoir, Propri~td et
Contrat 487 (2d ed 1924).
30 See Kull, 21 J Legal Stud at 49 (cited in note 21) ("Bufnoir's lectures.., continue to be
cited by American writers for this ... assertion."). However, even Fuller shied away from relying
too heavily on this argument. See Fuller, 41 Colum L Rev at 815 n 23 (cited in note 19) (observ-
ing that "[t]his remark of Bufnoir's cannot be taken too literally"). See also Kull, 21 J Legal Stud
at 49 n 33 (cited in note 21) ("None of these authors [citing the sterility of donative promises]
argue that the gift promise is entirely 'sterile.' All, in fact, suggest some respects in which a gift
promise might be at least modestly fruitful.").
31 Eisenberg, 47 U Chi L Rev at 4 (cited in note 18).
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of a gift suggests thoughtfulness and affection on the part of the giver,
and these sentimental effects may increase the gift's value well beyond
its purchase price. Second, in some situations the donor may have bet-
ter information than the donee either about the donee's preferences
or, more likely, about the existence, availability, or value of the gift.
The donor may also have better access to the gift. For instance, the
donor may promise to return from a trip to the Andes with an Incan
vase she knows her friend would love. Third, many gifts cannot be
purchased. A particular piece of artwork, for instance, may only exist
in the donor's collection. If the donee values the piece more than the
donor, the donor will increase social welfare by giving it as a gift. Do-
native promises to perform services often fall into this category.
Fourth, the donor gets satisfaction from knowing that her gift will be
appreciated by the donee-in economic terms, the donor and donee
have "interdependent utility functions. 32 As Richard Posner has ob-
served, "[A] promise would not be made unless it conferred utility on
the promisor."3 Even if the donee values the gift below its cost, the
combination of the donor's satisfaction and the gift's value to the
donee may exceed the gift's cost. Finally, gifts may be given as a means
of facilitating future economic transactions, such as when businessmen
exchange small tokens at the start of a business deal.' Even if the ini-
tial gift exchange does not increase social welfare, the ensuing eco-
nomic transaction that it facilitates very well might.
More fundamentally, however, even if donative transfers were so-
cially sterile, donative promises would still be socially valuable be-
cause they allow for beneficial reliance in advance of performance. As
Eric Posner explains, "A promise to give a gift enables the promisee to
32 See Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of
Consideration, 29 Loyola LA L Rev 713,820 (1996) ("Interdependent utility is a perfectly famil-
iar phenomenon and is quite likely to be present in the context of true donative promises among
family or friends."); Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination
of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L J 1261, 1272 (1980) (discussing costs and benefits created by
intrafamilial promises).
33 R. Posner, 6 J Legal Stud at 412 (cited in note 19). See also Joseph Siprut, The Pepper-
corn Reconsidered: Why a Promise to Sell Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding,
But Should Be, 97 Nw U L Rev 1809,1831-33 (2003) (analyzing "self-interested altruism" in relation
to donative promises).
34 See Wessman, 29 Loyola LA L Rev at 820 (cited in note 32) (arguing exchange-related
business promises "increase the likelihood of beneficial exchange"); Carol M. Rose, Giving,
Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly)
Vice Versa, 44 Fla L Rev 295, 311 (1992) (noting that the practice of "giv[ing] a little for the sake
of the larger bargain.., happens all the time among business dealers" and that "if someone does
not give, the exchange may never get off the ground"); Gordon, 75 Cornell L Rev at 995 (cited in
note 20) ("Some promises are related to exchanges, are ancillary to bargains, but are not them-
selves given in exchange for some identifiable price. These promises have economic and social
utility because they assist exchanges and promote economic activity.").
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rely in anticipation of receiving the benefit and enables the promisor
to defer performance until the funds or goods are acquired."35 If a
donee knows that a donor intends to give her a car at some future
date, she can avoid the costs of purchasing a car on her own in the
interim. Beneficial reliance of this sort is made possible by the en-
forcement of the promise because the donee can rest assured that her
reliance will not be in vain. Even if donative gifts were sterile, the legal
enforcement of donative promises could still be welfare enhancing.6
2. The "trivial" rationale.
A second substantive argument against enforcing donative prom-
ises is that such promises are too trivial to merit legal recognition.
Donative promises are sometimes casual and insignificant -of the "I
promise to take you out to dinner" variety." Allowing legal enforce-
ment of donative promises might involve the court system in "a lot of
trivial promises arising in social and family settings."'" The exception
to the consideration doctrine for charitable pledges has been justified
by contrasting the trivial nature of most donative promises with "the
large size of many charitable donations."9 The consideration doctrine
supposedly prevents the legal system from having to assume the ad-
ministratively costly job of policing interpersonal squabbles.' °
However, even if it were true that many donative promises are
too trivial to merit legal enforcement, the consideration doctrine is a
curious way to deal with the problem. A much more direct approach
would be to refuse to involve the legal system in disputes in which
only a small sum was at issue. Moreover, there is little reason to as-
sume donative promises tend to be relatively insignificant, or that the
costs of litigating such promises would be particularly high. Many do-
native promises tend to be quite substantial-for instance, "[a] par-
ent's promise to finance a medical school education."41 And even
where small donative promises are concerned, as Charles Goetz and
Robert Scott point out, "it is no less expensive to litigate most small
35 E. Posner, 112 Yale L J at 850 (cited in note 3). See also Goetz and Scott, 89 Yale L J at
1269 (cited in note 32) ("[T]he production of beneficial reliance is perhaps the principal social
rationale of promising.").
36 See R. Posner, 6 J Legal Stud at 411-14 (cited in note 19).
37 See id at 416-17 (discussing general rule of nonenforcability for gratuitous promises).
38 R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 109 (cited in note 17).
39 R. Posner, 6 J Legal Stud at 420 (cited in note 19).
40 See Eisenberg, 47 U Chi L Rev at 5-6 (cited in note 18); Posner, 6 J Legal Stud at 417
(cited in note 19).
41 Wessman, 29 Loyola LA L Rev at 826 (cited in note 32) ("The claim that gratuitous or
donative promises are financially trivial is [ ] empirically suspect.").
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contracts., 42 As a means of screening out trivial disputes, the consid-
eration doctrine is both underinclusive (since many donative promises
are large) and overinclusive (since many contracts are small). Addi-
tionally, promisees are unlikely to sue promisors for breach of trivial
promises. As Andrew Kull observes, litigation over a promise to take
someone out to dinner "would be a freak occurrence. 4 3 Finally, the
legal system already denies enforcement to promises -whether uni-
lateral or bilateral-for which any injury is truly minimal.- Thus, re-
course to the consideration doctrine to screen out trivial promises is
not needed.
3. The "unnecessary" rationale.
A third substantive argument maintains that enforcement of do-
native promises is unnecessary because extralegal sanctions will be suf-
ficient to ensure performance. For altruistic promisors who care about
the well-being of their promisees, "the promisor may regard costs suf-
fered by the promisee as equivalent to costs suffered by himself," thus
obviating the need for a legal sanction. 5 Moreover, social norms
against reneging may shame into performance even those promisors
unconcerned about their promisee's interests. Therefore, some claim
that legal enforcement of donative promises is superfluous.
Yet arguments based on extraleglal sanctions hold no more valid-
ity than arguments claiming that donative promises are trivial or ster-
ile. First, even if extraleglal influences can ensure performance in most
instances, this does not explain why legal remedies should be unavail-
able where such influences prove insufficient. Second, extraleglal
sanctions may also be more important than the law for most bargain
exchanges. Sociological accounts have long recognized that busi-nessmen "seldom use legal sanctions ... to settle disputes 47 because
42 Goetz and Scott, 89 Yale L J at 1301 (cited in note 32).
43 Kull, 21 J Legal Stud at 56 (cited in note 21).
44 See Gordon, 75 Cornell L Rev at 995 (cited in note 20):
[T]he law already screens out claims involving trivial injuries by awarding only certain
kinds of damages. For example, suppose A and B mutually promise to meet each other for
dinner. The mutual promises are valid consideration .... However, the law declines to com-
pensate with damages the slight injury suffered, and so the case is not worth pursuing.
See also Kull, 21 J Legal Stud at 57 (cited in note 21) (observing that enforcement of trivial
bargains may be inefficient).
45 Goetz and Scott, 89 Yale L J at 1304 (cited in note 32).
46 See Gordon, 75 Cornell L Rev at 994 (cited in note 20) ("Contracts are binding because
business people adhere to the widely accepted norm that commitments are to be honored in
almost all situations.").
47 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am
Soc Rev 55,55 (1963).
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"there are many effective non-legal sanctions," such as norms of hon-
esty, close ties between those in the same industry, and anticipation of
future interactions." Third, extralegal sanctions may prove ineffective
to ensure performance when the promisor has passed away. The pro-
misor's heirs or estate may be much less concerned with the pro-
misee's welfare, less influenced by norms of promisekeeping (since it
was not their promise in the first place), and less likely to face social
opprobrium from the relevant peer group. Indeed, suits against promi-
sors' estates represent "[t]he overwhelming majority of suits to en-
force [donative] promises.,
49
In sum, substantive arguments for the consideration doctrine fall
short because the presence of consideration is a poor proxy for a
promise's value or society's interest in enforcing it. Donative promises
are not necessarily any less socially beneficial or significant than bilat-
eral promises, nor is the legal enforcement of donative promises any
less necessary.
Existing accounts, whether substantive or formal, fail to offer a
convincing rationale for not enforcing donative promises where the
parties clearly intended the promise to be legally binding. This lack of
a coherent theoretical explanation for the consideration doctrine has
plagued its application in courts of law.
C. The Morass of Current Doctrine
As the previous sections demonstrate, the consideration doctrine
lacks a compelling justification under existing theories. Indeed, the
two categories of justification for the doctrine often conflict. While
formal arguments suggest that any promise taking the requisite form
should be legally enforceable, substantive arguments invite courts to
further inquire into promises' social usefulness. This ambivalence has
manifested itself in the doctrine, with some authorities favoring the
former and others the latter. The result is a confused state of affairs in
which potential promisors face uncertainty about which donative
promises will be enforced. As one commentator noted: "The courts
are not consistent in their application of the rule, partly because they
are unwilling to enforce it strictly in all cases, and partly because they
49 Id at 63.
49 Kull, 21 J Legal Stud at 45-46 (cited in note 21):
The reason may be that unequivocal gift promises are highly likely to be performed, pro-
vided the promisor lives long enough; or that the recipient of a gift promise, feeling toward
his benefactor something of the same altruism that motivates the promise, is likely to for-
give a performance that the promisor subsequently comes to regret.
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are often hazy in their understanding and knowledge of the topic. All
this leads to present uncertainty and doubt."'°
Consider first the notion that courts will strike down promises
backed by only trivial amounts of consideration. Authorities fall into
opposing camps on the subject. According to traditional doctrine, so
long as both sides of a transaction receive something from the ex-
change, the fact that one side receives something of much greater
value is of no moment.' Indeed, even if what one party gives up is of
nearly no value at all but is only given for the sake of serving as con-
sideration -so-called nominal consideration 2 or peppercorn consid-
eration-the exchange remains legally enforceable. Thus, in 1932 the
Restatement (First) of Contracts maintained that a promise by one
party to transfer land valued at $5,000 to another party in exchange
for $1 is supported by "sufficient" consideration." This notion of con-
sideration is highly formal-in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
then of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, "consideration is
as much a form as a seal."'m
Cases that follow the First Restatement prioritize the considera-
tion doctrine's formal justifications over its substantivist ones. In
Scholes v Lehmann for instance, the court cited Fuller's Considera-
tion and Form for the proposition that the consideration doctrine
serves formal purposes: "a cautionary function of bringing home to
50 Clarence D. Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration, 26 Harv L Rev 429, 429 (1913). Al-
though written in 1913, these words remain the view of many scholars today. See, for example,
Wessman, 29 Loyola LA L Rev at 809-12 (cited in note 32) (observing that "idiosyncratic
subrules have introduced a degree of incoherence" into the doctrine of consideration).
51 See, for example, Thomas v Thomas, 114 Eng Rep 330, 333 (QB 1842) (finding legally
sufficient consideration in the exchange of a life estate in property for a promise to pay £1 per
year and keep the premises in good repair). See also The Form of Bargain as Consideration in
Contracts, 24 Colum L Rev 896, 900-01 (1924) (collecting cases).
52 See Joseph M. Perillo and Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 at 83
(West 2d ed 1994) ("By the word 'nominal' we mean 'in name only'-the purported consideration is
given, but is not bargained for as part of an exchange. It is given as a mere pretense or formality.").
53 Restatement (First) of Contracts § 84, illustration 1 (1932).
54 Krell v Codman, 154 Mass 454,28 NE 578,578 (1891) ("We presume that, in the absence
of fraud, oppression, or unconscionableness, the courts would not inquire into the amount of
such consideration.").
55 See, for example, Smith v Riley, 2002 Tenn App LEXIS 65, *9 ("[A] stipulation in con-
sideration of $1 is just as effectual and valuable a consideration as a larger sum stipulated for or
paid."), quoting Danheiser v Germania Savings Bank & Trust Co, 194 SW 1094,1096 (Tenn 1917);
Lacer v Navajo County, 141 Ariz 396, 687 P2d 404, 410 (1983); Hart v Hart, 160 NW2d 438, 444
(Iowa 1968), quoting 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts § 102 at 445-46 (1964) (second alteration in Hart):
The general rule is that consideration is not insufficient merely because it is inadequate.
The legal sufficiency of a consideration for a promise does not depend upon the compara-
tive economic value of the consideration and of what is promised in return .... Even a
nominal consideration ... will sustain a promise if it is the consideration in fact agreed upon.
56 56 F3d 750 (7th Cir 1995).
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the promisor the fact that his promise is legally enforceable and an
evidentiary function, important in a legal regime that enforces oral con-
tracts, of making it more likely that an enforceable promise was in-
tended."57 Notably, the court omits any reference to Fuller's description
of donative promises as economically sterile-or to any other substan-
tivist concerns. Instead, the court opines that a court will not even con-
sider the consideration's adequacy unless fraud or mistake is alleged."
Rejecting this formal approach, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts suggests that courts look past the form of the transaction to
make sure that gratuitous promises cannot be transformed into bind-
ing contracts by adding minimal amounts of consideration. That the
parties intend to be bound is not enough. Transfer of "nominal" con-
sideration in order to make a donative promise legally binding will not
be respected. 9 Because nominal consideration is not bargained for,
but is instead merely a formality-that is, because the transaction is
donative in substance, even though it is an exchange in form-it is not
sufficient to render an agreement legally enforceable. In other words,
courts should look through parties' attempts to dress up a donative
promise as an exchange.6'
Courts that follow the Restatement (Second)'s approach refuse
to enforce promises they suspect of being gifts. In O'Neil v De-
Laney," the court observed that a gross disparity between the value of
a promise and the consideration offered in return signals that the par-
ties "did not actually agree upon an exchange."'' The use of nominal
57 Idat756.
58 Id ("One purpose the [consideration] requirement does not serve [] is identifying fair
exchanges. Unless fraud or mistake is alleged, ordinarily a court will not even permit inquiry into
the adequacy of the consideration for a promise or a transfer.").
59 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(1)-(2) (1979).
60 See id § 71, illustration 4:
A desires to make a binding promise to give $1000 to his son B. Being advised that a gratui-
tous promise is not binding, A offers to buy from B for $1000 a book worth less than $1. B
accepts the offer knowing that the purchase of the book is a mere pretense. There is no con-
sideration for A's promise to pay $ 1000.
61 See also Perillo and Bender, Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 (cited in note 52) (agreeing with
the Restatement (Second)); John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 80 (Bobbs-Merrill 2d ed
1974) (arguing that consideration requires "a real bargain, and this can be found to exist if the
consideration is apparently a material cause in inducing the making of a promise").
62 See, for example, Scott v Scott, 86 Ark App 120,161 SW3d 307,311 (2004) ("[Tlwo deeds
recited only nominal consideration, and it has been recognized that such a recitation does not
destroy the transaction's character as a gift.") ; Noel v Noel, 212 Kan 583,512 P2d 324, 328 (1973)
(observing that the recital of "'[1]ove and affection and one dollar'" as consideration will not
render a promise enforceable since it "is characteristic of a gift").
63 92 I11 App 3d 292,415 NE2d 1260 (1980).
64 Id at 1265, quoting Arthur L. Corbin, 1 Corbin on Contracts § 127 at 546 (West 1963).
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consideration is a "mere formality"6 -a fact that, for the court, coun-
sels against enforcement. Many courts pay lip service to the notion
that consideration's adequacy is not to be scrutinized but then pro-
ceed to do just that, often by suggesting that a gross disparity in the
value of promises exchanged indicates fraud or unconscionability. 6
Typical is Goodwine State Bank v Mullins.7 The court starts with
what seems like a categorical prohibition: "While the court will in-
quire to determine whether a contract is supported by consideration,
it will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration. ' '6 In its next
breath, however, the court notes that an inquiry may be appropriate
where "the amount is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience
of the court."' Significantly, the court makes no mention of the parties'
intentions. That the promisor meant to be bound is immaterial; what
matters is whether the transaction is such as to merit enforcement.
Authorities are thus split between the Restatement (First)'s for-
mal approach and the Restatement (Second)'s substantive approach.
Yet even authorities that generally insist that consideration be non-
trivial often make exceptions for certain classes of promises. For in-
stance, option contracts and guarantee contracts represent two nota-
ble exceptions to the rule that consideration must be bargained for.
What explains this striking departure? According to the Restatement
(Second), the exceptions for option and guarantee contracts result from
their social utility. This social usefulness contrasts with the claimed
sterility of ordinary donative promises." Since option contracts and
guarantee contracts are socially valuable in substance, any imperfec-
tions in form can be ignored.2 Ironically, whereas these authorities
65 O'Neil, 415 NE2d at 1265, quoting Corbin, 1 Corbin on Contracts § 127 at 546. Interest-
ingly, the quoted section of Corbin cites Holmes's opinion in Krell v Codman, 28 NE 578, for
support. Yet Holmes never used the word "mere" to describe the effect of nominal consideration,
and it is far from clear that Holmes disapproved of its use. See note 54 and accompanying text.
66 See, for example, Rose v Lurvey, 40 Mich App 230, 198 NW2d 839,841-42 (1972) (rely-
ing on its power of equity to invalidate the transfer of a parcel of land for $1.05 and noting that
"[it is a general principle of contract law that courts will not ordinarily look into the adequacy of
the consideration in an agreed exchange. Equity will, however, grant relief where the inadequacy
of consideration is particularly glaring").
67 253 Ill App 3d 980,625 NE2d 1056 (1993).
68 Id at 1079.
69 Id.
70 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87, comment (b) and § 88, comment (a). See also 1464-
Eight, Ltd v Joppich, 154 SW3d 101,110 (Tex 2004) (adopting the Second Restatement's reasoning).
71 See Perillo and Bender, Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 at 88 (cited in note 52) (arguing that
the doctrine of nominal consideration need not be applied to option and guarantee contracts
because "[i]t is the area of the donative promise that justifies the invalidity of nominal consideration").
72 See also Joppich, 154 SW3d at 110 (agreeing with the Restatement (Second) that an
exception to the traditional consideration doctrine is warranted in the case of option contracts
because of their social utility).
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normally prioritize substance over form, they are willing to accept form
over substance for promises that they recognize as sufficiently valuable.
While many courts agree that some promises deserve special
treatment and can be exempted from the full consideration require-
ment, there is little agreement about exactly how special this treat-
ment should be. The majority position maintains that option and guar-
antee contracts are enforceable with only nominal consideration but
refuses to enforce promises where consideration is promised but
never delivered-so-called sham consideration.3 The minority posi-
tion would enforce such contracts even with sham consideration." The
Restatement (Second) endorses the minority approach, opining that
option and guarantee contracts may be binding even if the purported
consideration never changes hands."' A third position would require
no consideration whatsoever; Corbin on Contracts argues that
"[c]ommercial promises such as options and credit guaranties should
be enforceable without consideration.""
Each position thus takes a different stance on how much of a
formality should be required to render an option or guarantee con-
tract enforceable-nominal consideration, sham consideration, or no
consideration. At base, this conflict represents a disagreement about
the persuasiveness of formal and substantive justifications for the con-
sideration doctrine, and about how to make tradeoffs between the
two. Equitable concerns invariably put pressures on courts to relax the
strict substantive approach in appropriate cases. But because courts
lack a single compelling justification for the consideration requirement,
they inevitably disagree about when (if ever) to make exceptions.
Consider other deviations from the bargained-for requirement.
Some courts will enforce many unilateral promises without even a
pretense of consideration. Apparently the courts regard these prom-
ises as even more substantively valuable than option and guarantee
contracts. One author found the following examples:
73 See, for example, Lewis v Fletcher, 101 Idaho 530, 617 P2d 834, 836 (1980) (rejecting
explicitly the Restatement (Second)'s "minority position" that recitation of nominal considera-
tion creates a binding option); Berryman v Kmoch, 221 Kan 304,559 P2d 790,793-96 (1977).
74 See, for example, Joppich, 154 SW3d at 110 (describing the Restatement (Second) as the
"minority" view); Real Estate Co of Pittsburgh v Rudolph, 301 Pa 502, 153 A 438,439 (1930) ("A
valuable consideration, however small or nominal, if given or stipulated for in good faith, is...
sufficient to support an action on any parol contract."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§§ 87-88. See also Murray on Contracts § 61 at 1 (4th ed 2001) ("[M]ost courts hold that, upon
proof that the recited amount has not been paid, the promise fails for want of consideration.").
75 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87, comment c ("[Tihe option agreement is not
invalidated by proof that the recited consideration was not in fact given."); id at § 88, comment b
(precluding inquiry into whether the purported consideration "was in fact given").
76 Perillo and Bender, Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 at 87-88 (cited in note 52). See also
Joppich, 154 SW3d at 110-11 (Jefferson concurring) (agreeing with Corbin on Contracts).
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[P]romises to waive nonmaterial conditions; promises to pay a
prior indebtedness which was unenforceable because of the stat-
ute of limitations, the promisor's minority, or bankruptcy; certain
promises made in recognition of a benefit previously received by
the promisor; stipulations regarding pending judicial proceedings;
and firm offers by merchants, written waivers of claims, and cer-
tain negotiable instruments under the UCC.T
And this list is not exclusive. 8
Predictably, not all courts share the same view on the value of
various promises. For instance, charitable donations are enforceable
without consideration in many jurisdictions, while in others they are
not. Courts have carved out exceptions to exceptions, as doctrinal
consistency and coherence are abandoned in favor of preferred policy
objectives.8' And further compounding this uncertainty is the fact that
courts sometimes misapply the doctrine.n
The current state of the consideration doctrine is thus deeply con-
fused: nominal consideration will render a promise enforceable in
some jurisdictions, but not in others. In jurisdictions disallowing nomi-
nal consideration, formalities are not sufficient, except for certain
categories of promises where they are. And such jurisdictions disagree
about which promises merit an exception and what sort of formalities
will suffice. Unless a new persuasive explanation for it can be made,
the consideration doctrine is destined to produce conflicting results in
77 Gordon, 75 Cornell L Rev at 1001-02 (cited in note 20).
78 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(2), comment f (observing that
courts routinely enforce charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements that are unsupported
by consideration).
79 See, for example, Salsbury v Northwestern Bell Telephone Co, 221 NW2d 609, 613 (Iowa
1974) (holding it lawful to "bind charitable subscriptions without requiring a showing of considera-
tion"). See also Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90(2), comment f ("American courts have tradi-
tionally favored charitable subscriptions ... and have found consideration in many cases where
the element of exchange was doubtful or nonexistent.").
80 See, for example, Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v DeLeo, 405 Mass 365, 540
NE2d 691, 693-94 (1989) (refusing to apply § 90 where "there is no injustice" in refusing to en-
force a promised charitable subscription); Maryland National Bank v United Jewish Appeal
Federation of Greater Washington, Inc, 286 Md 274, 407 A2d 1130, 1138 (1979) (holding that a
charitable pledge was not legally binding since "there was no consideration as required by con-
tract law"). Compare Schwedes v Romain, 179 Mont 466, 587 P2d 388, 390 (1978) (refusing to
allow a voidable or unenforceable promise to serve as consideration for a return promise) with
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 78 ("The fact that a rule of law renders a promise voidable
or unenforceable does not prevent it from being consideration.").
81 See Wessman, 29 Loyola LA L Rev at 810-12 (cited in note 32) (observing that "idio-
syncratic subrules have introduced a degree of incoherence into the doctrine").
82 See id at 810 & n 395 (describing different ways in which courts will misapply doctrine
of consideration).
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the hands of courts that disagree with one another about the reasons
for its existence.
II. THE ROLE OF ANTICOMMODIFICATION NORMS
In order to explain our novel account for the consideration doc-
trine, we must first dispel two flawed assumptions of the traditional
approaches. The first flawed assumption is that any promisor who
wishes to do so can back her promise with nominal consideration. We
need to defeat this assumption in order to show how the consideration
doctrine differs from other formal requirements for distinguishing be-
tween binding and nonbinding promises-such as a seal or writing
requirement. Scholars' inability to appreciate how nominal considera-
tion is a unique formalism has prevented them from valuing it over
alternative formalisms.
Our insight is that a nominal consideration requirement differs
from alternative formalisms because of anticommodification norms.
To invoke the consideration doctrine, contracting parties must point to
some form of recompense explicitly offered in return for a promise. In
other words, consideration requires the appearance of a bargain. Al-
though it may be trivial in size, the consideration must still be present;
the parties must be able to claim that the promise was given as part of
an exchange. " As such, the language required to satisfy the considera-
tion doctrine "commodifies" a promise-that is, turns the promise into
a commodity that is exchanged for another commodity. Commodifica-
tion of this sort can violate strong social taboos. These taboos serve to
make the consideration doctrine effectively unavailable in certain so-
cial circumstances, preventing parties from employing even the pre-
tense of consideration.
Scholars who write about commodification do not fully under-
stand the phenomenon.8 We lack a consensus understanding of what
categories of transactions are subject to commodification and how
these categories change over time. Nevertheless, there is widespread
agreement that social norms prohibit certain forms of transactions on
account of their commodifying nature. In this Part, we look to three
branches of knowledge: (1) sociology and anthropology, (2) philoso-
phy and political theory, and (3) economics and game theory. Al-
though the three scholarly fields rely on different methodologies, they
83 Even in the case of sham consideration, parties must still claim that consideration is present
84 See generally Carol M. Rose, Whither Commodification? (Yale Law School Public Law
& Legal Theory Paper Series Research Paper No 84, Center for Law, Economics and Public
Policy Research Paper No 308, 2005) online at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/paperscfm
?abstract id=706644 (visited Oct 17, 2006) (discussing recent controversies surrounding com-
modification as an analytical category).
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reach similar conclusions about the commodification phenomenon.
All three approaches support the existence of anticommodification
norms, and all three conclude that these norms govern transactions
where the relationships between the transacting parties or the social
messages sent by the transactions are more important than the desire
to transfer goods or services. On the other hand, when parties transact
with the primary purpose of exchanging goods or services, anticom-
modification norms seldom apply.
A. Commodification in Sociology and Anthropology
Sociologists and anthropologists have long recognized that mar-
ket exchanges and giftgiving represent drastically different social phe-
nomena, and that the norms governing the former are very different
from those governing the latter.8 Whereas individuals engaged in a
market context are expected to exhibit rational calculation based on
personal self-interest, explicit considerations of monetary gain are
taboo in relationships involving gifts. Indeed, such nonreciprocal in-
teractions are said to involve a wholly different manner of thinking."
Although not all sociologists and anthropologists use the term
commodification, there is widespread agreement that the language
and behavior used for market exchanges are often inappropriate for
gifts and for certain other forms of nonmarket transactions. Anyone
who conducts a gift transaction using the behavior reserved for mar-
ket exchanges risks commodifying the transaction and thereby violat-
ing social norms.
What accounts for the dichotomy between gift transactions and
market exchanges? While market exchanges are utilitarian in nature,
serving a discrete purpose and requiring no prolonged relationship
between the involved parties, giftgiving is a means by which two indi-
85 See, for example, David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False
Coin of Our Own Dreams 32 (Palgrave 2001); Lewis Hyde, The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic
Life of Property 62-66 (Vintage 1979) (comparing Ford Motor Company's analysis of whether to
install a safety device on the Ford Pinto to the moral calculus involved in organ donation);
George Herbert Palmer, Altruism: Its Nature and Varieties 60 (Scribner's Sons 1920).
86 See, for example, Jane B. Baron, Gifts; Bargains, and Form, 64 Ind L J 155, 196 (1989)
("The personal, connected quality of giving may require the donor to employ modes of thinking
quite different from those appropriate to the market. Some believe that economic transfers call
for detached, analytic deliberation in quantitative, cost-benefit terms which are inappropriate to
the emotional and moral realm of gifts."); Rose, Whither Commodification? at 31 (cited in note
84) ("[M]arketizing some human activities inappropriately makes us talk about them differently,
and talking about them differently can make us think about them differently."). But see Marcel
Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies 3 (Norton 1990) (W.D.
Halls, trans) ("Almost always such services have taken the form of the gift, the present gener-
ously given even when, in the gesture accompanying the transaction, there is only a polite fiction,
formalism, and social deceit, and when really there is obligation and economic self interest.").
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viduals establish an ongoing social intimacy." "The classic distinction
between commodities and gifts is that while commodity exchange is
concerned with establishing equivalencies between the value of objects,
'gifts' are primarily about relations between people."" The gift comes to
represent the value of the relationship, instilling the gift with a "to-
temic" quality that distinguishes it from a regular market commodity.9
As a result, giftgiving "must be based, or purport to be based, on
affective or moral motives, and it may not be expressly required by the
terms of the original transfer or viewed by the parties as the price of
the original transfer." Any outward sign that a gift has been assigned
a monetary value, by either the donor or the donee, is strictly forbid-
den.9 For a donee to offer to compensate a donor for a gift would be
to suggest that the donee has put a price on the gift -and, by implica-
tion, the relationship." Similarly, a donor "cannot demand or require
reciprocity without disqualifying his transfer as a gift"9 and thereby
demoting the status of her relationship with the donee. Thus, bargain-
ing, which requires an articulation and discussion of the object's value
by both donor and donee, cannot take place within the giftgiving rela-
tionship.
Consequently, the social context of giftgiving is incompatible with
the consideration form. To claim that a gift promise is being exchanged
for something in return-the essence of the consideration doctrine-is
to violate the social rules surrounding the giftgiving relationship. At-
tempts to invoke the consideration form can commodify a transaction
by suggesting that a price is being placed on the social interaction.
The distinction between giftgiving and market exchanges is not
always clear cut. Interactions that are ostensibly market based may be
constitutive of a relationship that requires its participants to adopt
many of the outward indications of friendship. A supplier may have a
87 See, for example, Gretchen M. Herrmann, Women's Exchange in the US. Garage Sale:
Giving Gifts and Creating Community, 10 Gender & Socy 703,710-11 (1996), quoting Hyde, The
Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property at 56 (cited in note 85) ("It is the cardinal dif-
ference between gift and commodity exchange that a gift establishes a feeling-bond between two
people, while the sale of a commodity leaves no necessary connection.").
88 Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value at 32 (cited in note 85).
89 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 Cal L Rev 821,
844-45 (1997) ("The significance of a gifted object lies ... in the totemic way in which the gift
reflects or manifests the relationship with the donee, in the tangible expression of a moral value
that is important to the donor, or both.").
90 Idat843.
91 See, for example, Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 172-73 (Cambridge
1988) (Richard Nice, trans) (describing the "scandal" that may result when monetary values are
assigned to gifts).
92 See, for example, Eisenberg, 85 Cal L Rev at 845 (cited in note 89) (noting occasions
where a gift of cash to an intimate "would be regarded as bizarre, deeply insulting, or both").
93 Id at 843.
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very cordial ongoing relationship with his distributor, requiring that he
refrain from exacting as great profits as possible when he knows the
distributor is pressed for cash. Similarly, giftgiving may be employed
as a means of facilitating future economic transactions.94 But the basic
point remains that reciprocation and negotiation--the explicit articu-
lation of and bargaining over value -are frequently precluded in some
gift-exchange scenarios due to social norms.
A possible objection to the above might dispute whether gift ex-
changes are truly nonreciprocal. Certainly, the giving of any particular
gift may be uncompensated in the sense that its transfer does not re-
sult in immediate monetary payment, but the gift may be given with
the expectation of a return gift in the future, and such expectation of
repayment is enforced through rigid social norms. If A gives B a birth-
day present, B may be obliged to respond in kind. As Marcel Mauss
wrote in his classic treatise on giftgiving, "[I]n theory [such gifts] are
voluntary[;] in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily."9'
Though accounting need not be one-for-one, anyone allowing himself
to fall too far in another's debt risks loss of face or even ostracism.
And even if the price of a gift is not a return gift, the donor may ex-
pect a return on her "beneficence" in the form of social esteem or
some other nonmaterial compensation. In the words of one anthro-
pologist, "[w]hen people act in ways that seem economically irrational,
this is only because the values they are maximizing are not material."''
Although the norms governing gift-exchange do not permit the par-
ticipants to explicitly acknowledge that their behavior is motivated by
self-interest, this may nonetheless be the primary motive.9
But while the underlying motivation of giftgiving may be self-
interest, what is relevant for our purposes is that gift-exchange par-
ticipants are barred from any outward acknowledgment of this moti-
vation. Social norms require a "polite fiction, formalism, and social
94 See Rose, 44 Fla L Rev at 295, 310-11 (cited in note 34) (noting that the practice of
"giv[ing] a little for the sake of the larger bargain ... happens all the time among business deal-
ers" and that "if someone does not give, the exchange may never get off the ground").
95 Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason at 3 (cited in note 86). See also Marcel Mauss,
The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies 1 (Norton 1967) (Ian Cunnison,
trans) ("The form usually taken is that of the gift generously offered.... [B]ut the accompanying
behavior is formal pretence and social deception, while the transaction itself is based on obliga-
tion and economic self-interest.")
96 Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value at 28 (cited in note 85). See also
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice at 177 (cited in note 91) ("[Plractice never ceases to
conform to economic calculation even when it gives every appearance of disinterestedness by
departing from the logic of interested calculation (in the narrow sense) and playing for stakes
that are non-material and not easily quantified.").
97 This description corresponds with our category of trust-building promises. See Part II.D.
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deceit" that forbids any discussion of compensation between gift-
exchange participants. Even when the parties are transacting based on
purely selfish motives, the giftgiving context prevents the articulation
of these motives in the manner required to invoke consideration.
Consider Michael Walzer's discussion of the Kula exchange
among the Trobiander islanders,
[The Kula] isn't a "trade" in our sense of the word: necklaces and
bracelets can never be exchanged from hand to hand, with the
equivalence between the two objects discussed, bargained about
and computed. The exchange has the form of a series of gifts....
[Contrast this with] what Malinowski calls "trade, pure and sim-
ple" and what the islanders call gimwali. Here the trade is in
commodities, not ritual objects; and it is entirely legitimate to
bargain, to haggle, to seek private advantage. The gimwali is free;
it can be carried on between any two strangers; and the striking
of a bargain terminates the transaction. The islanders draw a
sharp line between this sort of trade and the exchange of gifts.
When criticizing bad conduct in the Kula, they will say "it was
done like a gimwali."
The Kula presents a prime example of the social restrictions on
giftgiving transactions. Kula transactions are highly ritualized. Even
though Kula are given as part of an exchange, in the sense that the gift
of a Kula imposes obligations on the recipient, the participants are
precluded from explicitly voicing cost-benefit motives or considera-
tion-type language. The same phenomenon characterizes many giftgiv-
ing transactions in modern American society. As Carol Rose writes,
there are "occasions on which gifts are appropriate but cash is not.
Bringing a bottle of wine to the dinner party will be just fine, and may
even be expected, but paying its price in cash would offend the host."'O'
Just as the Kula exchange cannot be "done like a gimwali," many
modem forms of giftgiving preclude the use of market-oriented lan-
guage and behavior. Gifts may be exchanged in a ritualistic fashion,
but the parties may not bargain over these transactions or explicitly
acknowledge that the gifts are given in order to receive something in
return. According to the book Etiquette for Dummies, business gifts
must be given "freely, with no strings or conditions attached."0''
98 Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason at 3 (cited in note 86).
99 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 123-24 (Basic
1983) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
100 Rose, Whither Commodification? at 15-16 (cited in note 84).
101 Sue Fox, Etiquette for Dummies 188 (Hungry Minds 1999).
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Not all theorists agree that affective and economic interactions
occur in wholly distinct social arenas. The sociologist Viviana Zelizer,
for example, forcefully disputes this "Hostile Worlds" paradigm-her
label for the dominant view of the giftgiving relationship among soci-
ologists and anthropologists. Eschewing the notion that monetary
transactions are impossible among social intimates or that market par-
ticipants are incapable of affective relationships, she argues that real-
world interactions cannot be reduced to a simple either/or dichotomy.
On the one hand, participants engaged in ostensibly "market behav-
ior" often demonstrate a concern for one another that cannot be as-
cribed merely to economic self-interest. For example, a recent study of
home care workers and their patients demonstrates that genuine
bonds of friendship develop during what might be characterized as
fee-for-service transactions.'°3 Though they undeniably engage in mar-
ket behavior, it is impossible to accurately describe these actors as
mere market participants."m
And on the other hand, social relationships- even deeply inti-
mate ones -often involve monetary transactions:
[P]arents give their children allowances, subsidize their college
educations, help them with their first mortgage, and offer them
substantial bequests in their wills. Friends and relatives send gifts
of money as wedding presents, and friends loan each other
money. Immigrants dispatch remittances to kinfolk back home.'°
To claim that all human interactions can be categorized as either "eco-
nomic" or "social" is to ignore the complexity that attends real-world
relationships.'O' Instead, it is necessary to recognize that different types
of monetary transfers take place within different types of relationships.'
While such an admonition against reductionism is well taken, it
does not undermine the basic premise of our argument: that explicit
market-oriented articulations are off limits in certain social relation-
ships. Though norms might permit-and even encourage-a parent to
102 Viviana A. Zelizer, Intimate Transactions, in Mauro F. Guilldn, ed, The New Economic
Sociology: Developments in an Emerging Field 274,276 (Russell Sage 2002).
103 See Deborah Stone, Care and Trembling, The American Prospect 61 (Mar-Apr 1999).
104 See Susan Himmelweit, Caring Labor, in Ronnie J. Steinberg and Deborah M. Figart,
eds, Emotional Labor in the Service Economy, 561 Annals of Am Acad of Polit & Soc Sci 27, 32
(special issue 1999) ("It is not so much that we are adding an element of the unpaid to the paid
but that paid relationships themselves can include strong feelings and personal attachments.").
105 Zelizer, Intimate Transactions at 279 (cited in note 102).
106 See id (arguing that the idea "that money and intimacy represent contradictory princi-
ples whose intersection generates conflict" represents a "failure to recognize how regularly
intimate social transactions coexist with monetary transactions").
107 See id at 280. See generally Vivian A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (Princeton
1994).
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loan her child money to help with the down payment on a house, a
parent who charges her child a premium "because you're such a poor
credit risk" would likely run afoul of taboos. Transactions involving
money may not per se be impossible among social intimates, but the
conditions under which transfers may be proposed, discussed, and
completed are much more limited than those acceptable for market
transactions-even if the market participants do not treat each other
merely as tools of personal gain. That different forms of monetary
transactions are permissible within different relationships does not
defeat the basic argument, so long as contexts remain in which parties
cannot specifically articulate consideration.
To summarize, even if we reject the dominant "hostile worlds"
paradigm, we can still conclude that social norms prevent parties from
voicing consideration for certain nonmarket transactions. The explicit
quid pro quo language needed to invoke consideration risks express-
ing utilitarian motives and thus commodifying the relationship. Non-
commodifiable gift transactions often operate within a highly ritual-
ized social space where the message conveyed by a gift is more impor-
tant than the gift itself. Muddying such gifts with consideration lan-
guage can be viewed as rude and offensive, potentially undermining
the feelings of trust and affection that form the basis of these non-
market relationships.
B. Commodification in Philosophy and Political Theory
Commodification in philosophy and political theory arises from
the concept of spheres. Sphere-oriented theorists usually place market
exchanges into one sphere and nonmarket transactions, or at least
certain forms of nonmarket transactions, into another sphere.'" The
use of market-oriented behavior or language within the nonmarket
sphere is deemed corrupting. '  More specifically, these theorists "sug-
gest that there are various 'spheres' (sometimes called 'modes') of
valuation, and an exchange is corrupting when it ignores the differ-
ences between these spheres of valuation and forces us to value all
108 Theorists disagree about the number and classification of spheres. For instance, Michael
Sandel argues for three spheres-market goods, civic goods, and sacred goods. See Michael Sandel,
What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, in 21 Grethe B. Peterson, ed, The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values 87, 122 (Utah 2000). In contrast, Walzer identifies a multitude of
spheres, and claims that the delineation between these spheres differs amongst various societies
and times. See Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 9 (cited in note 99) ("Social meanings are historical in
character; and so distributions, and just and unjust distributions. change over time."). Still, essen-
tially all sphere-oriented theorists define separate spheres for market and nonmarket transactions.
109 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in
Law, in Ruth Chang, ed, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason 234, 234-38
(Harvard 1997).
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goods in the same way."... The value premises behind transactions in
the nonmarket sphere are considered "incommensurable" with the
value premises of the market sphere. Mixing these value premises
does "violence to our considered judgments about how these goods
are best characterized.""'
Even though the sale of nonmarket-sphere goods is impermissi-
ble, these goods may still be given as gifts, as long as the transactions
take place without the use of market-oriented language. So whereas
baby selling is taboo, adoption is fully acceptable.12 Where the sale of
organs is controversial, organ donation is laudable."' And while prosti-
tution is highly frowned upon, the free exchange of sexual favors is
not equally condemned. As long as the participants in a gift transac-
tion eschew the bargain form, they can usually complete nonmarket-
sphere exchanges without violating social norms. The key distinction is
that parties cannot explicitly articulate consideration-type language or
explicitly contemplate consideration-type motives. A suitor may give
jewelry in the hopes of receiving sexual favors, and the recipient may
reward the gift by providing such favors. Yet if the parties openly ac-
knowledge that the jewelry is being exchanged for sex, or bargain over
the transaction, the exchange is labeled prostitution and becomes ta-
boo. Similarly, adopting parents are allowed to pay for certain of the
birth mother's expenses, but not for the actual child. Any suggestion
that payments are made in order to induce the birth mother to give up
her child would violate both social norms and the laws of most states. 1"
At the risk of vastly oversimplifying the literature, we divide
sphere-oriented theories into two general categories based on their
rationales for keeping the spheres distinct. First, consequentialist ap-
proaches worry about the corrupting force of market imperialism. In
the words of one scholar, "the application of market rhetoric to non-
commodifiable matters coarsens our understanding of these matters,
leading us into mistakes, loosening our moral grasp, and undermining
our ties to others.' '"5 For instance, "[f]rom a conservative perspective,
this is the problem with ... marriage. Contract obligations in this inti-
110 Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Refraining the Commodification
Debate, 117 Harv L Rev 689,692 (2003).
111 Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation at 238 (cited in note 109).
112 Margaret Jane Radin and Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification,
in Martha M. Ertman and Joan C. Williams, eds, Rethinking Commodification: Cases and Read-
ings in Law and Culture 8,11 (NYU 2005).
113 Id.
114 See In re Baby M, 109 NJ 396, 537 A2d 1227, 1234 (1988) (invalidating a surrogacy con-
tract as against the law and public policy of the state).
115 Rose, Whither Commodification? at 31 (cited in note 84), summarizing an argument
from Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 Harv L Rev 1849 (cited in note 8).
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mate setting, it is said, could make the married partners talk and think
about their individual entitlements, undermining the moral foundation
of sharing that should permeate their relationship.116 Ever since Tit-
muss' classic work on blood donation, scholars have recognized that
allowing market-form transactions into the nonmarket sphere can
undermine the social norms and relationships needed for the nonmar-
ket sphere to function. " Once some people are paid for their blood,
blood donation may lose its expressive character as a duty of good
community members. Or as Kimbrell writes, "[i]f I buy a Nobel Prize, I
corrupt the meaning of the Nobel Prize....1 Similarly, conducting a
friendship based on explicit cost-benefit analysis corrupts the meaning
of the friendship relationship.
As an alternative form of consequentialist argument, Walzer fa-
mously claimed that humans flourish within many different spheres of
activity."'9 Inevitably, human relations become unequal within individ-
ual spheres-as employers dominate employees, doctors dominate
patients, and the wealthy dominate the poor. Yet justice requires that
we not allow unequal power within one sphere to be leveraged into
unequal power in other spheres. No person should be able to domi-
nate another within all spheres of human activity. The nonmarket
spheres must, therefore, be shielded from market logic in order to
prevent disparities in wealth and market power from creating com-
plete inequality across multiple spheres. If the wealthy were allowed
to explicitly purchase friendship, romance, or esteem, inequities in
wealth would engender more widespread and insidious forms of ine-
quality and injustice."'
116 Rose, Whither Commodification? at 32 (cited in note 84).
117 Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift of Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy 225
(Pantheon 1971) ("[Tlhe ways in which society organizes and structures its social institutions ...
can encourage or discourage the altruistic in man."). However, other scholars challenge the claim
that market imperialism undermines the values underlying the nonmarket sphere. See, for ex-
ample, Thomas Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2, 90 Am
Hist Rev 547, 549 (1985) ("After nearly two centuries of criticism of market society, it is easy to
forget how brutal life could be before the profit motive ruled supreme and how moderate, in the
long perspective of human history, the capitalist's license for aggression really is."); Albert 0.
Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests 58 (Princeton 1977) ("The evaluation of commercial
and money-making pursuits as harmless and innocuous can be understood as an indirect conse-
quence of the long-dominant aristocratic ideal."). See also Viviana A. Zelizer, Intimate Transac-
tions at 279 (cited in note 102).
118 Andrew Kimbrell, The Human Body Shop: The Engineering and Marketing of Life 35
(HarperCollins 1993), quoting Sacred of for Sale? Harper's Magainze 47, 50 (Oct 1990) (state-
ment of William May).
119 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 4 (cited in note 99) ("[H]istory displays a great variety of
arrangements and ideologies.").
120 Of course, barriers between the spheres can never be perfect. Even without explicit
bargaining, the wealthy can leverage their monetary assets into power within other spheres. But
2006] 1329
The University of Chicago Law Review
Whereas consequentialist arguments focus on the social conse-
quences of market imperialism, dignity-oriented theories claim that
subjecting nonmarket relationships to bargain-form logic directly
harms the object of this commodification. Nonmarket goods and rela-
tionships are thought to be infused with an inherent dignity. Subject-
ing these goods or relationships to market language and behavior
represents a failure to accord them with the respect they deserve.
Elizabeth Anderson labels "the mode of valuation appropriate to pure
commodities 'use. ' ,121 She claims that "[u]se is a lower, impersonal, and
exclusive mode of valuation. It is contrasted with higher modes of
valuation, such as respect. To merely use something is to subordinate it
to one's own ends, without regard for its intrinsic value."'
'2
Dignity-based arguments draw support from Kant's categorical
imperative against treating humans only as a means.'2 Due respect for
human dignity and autonomy requires that people be regarded as
ends in themselves. Expanding on this logic, modern dignity-oriented
theorists have argued that a wide variety of goods-such as environ-
mental resources-similarly deserve to be treated as ends in them-
selves.'24 Viewing a good or relationship as an end prohibits bargaining
in a manner that suggests the good or relationship is valued solely for
its use potential.
Another form of dignity-based argument claims the use of market
language denies the uniqueness of the object of the bargain. "Market
rhetoric assumes that everything can be traded for everything else,
and that through the medium of money, all is fungible.". For people
or goods with inherent dignity, this assertion of fungibility offends the
sense of uniqueness and self-worth. For example, "[y]our children
might be frightened and confused if they hear you talk about the mar-
ket for babies.' 26 No child should have to wonder about their market
value; neither should a friend or intimate. Bargaining over goods with
inherent dignity results in the "simplifying and flattening [of] all nu-
ance, idiosyncrasy, and sentiment, not only for the speaker of this
rhetoric but for [the] hearers as well.' '17 Proper respect for nonmarket
social norms against consideration-type bargaining for nonmarket goods can, arguably, limit the
corrosive effects of market imperialism.
121 Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 144 (Harvard 1993) (offering a new
theory of value and rationality that rejects cost-benefit analysis in certain situations).
122 Id
123 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 429 (Hackett 1981) (James W.
Ellington, trans).
124 See, for example, Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth 90 (Cambridge 1988).
125 Rose, Whither Commodification? at 23 (cited in note 84).
126 Id at 31.
127 Id at 31-32.
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goods and relationships requires recognition of their nonfungibility.
Explicitly suggesting that these goods or relationships can be exchanged
for something of value undermines their claims to uniqueness and in-
herent dignity. A favor rendered by a friend is not the same as a service
purchased in the market and should not be treated as though it were.
The commodification literature in philosophy and political theory
is controversial. 12 Some market adherents call for removing barriers to
commodification and expanding the scope of the market, while pro-
ponents of anticommodification norms often wish to strengthen those
norms through acts of law. We lack general agreement about the proper
scope of the nonmarket sphere or about the rationales for protecting
the sphere from market rhetoric and logic. Nevertheless, there is wide-
spread consensus that norms shield at least some forms of nonmarket
transactions from bargain-form language. And few call for completely
abolishing the nonmarket sphere; no one wants to reestablish slavery
or to force intimates to explicitly negotiate every aspect of their rela-
tionships. The literature from philosophy and political theory adds
support for the existence of anticommodification norms and explains
potential rationales for the function of these norms.
C. Commodification in Economics and Game Theory
Economists seldom concern themselves with concepts like com-
modification. A basic tenet of neoclassical economic theory is that indi-
viduals act as rational agents. Almost by definition, rational agents would
be unlikely to deny themselves the use of a legally binding form merely
on account of social norms. However, there are several branches of game
theory literature which develop a concept similar to commodification.
In order to explain how commodification works within the game
theory literature, we categorize promises as being of four types based
on the motives of the promisor. ' Our schema labels promises as ei-
ther exchange oriented, trust building, status enhancing, or altruistic."°
Promisors make exchange-oriented promises in order to receive a
defined benefit from promisees in recognition of their promise. In
contrast, promisors make trust-building promises in order to receive
undefined benefits from a promisee. These promisors typically seek to
develop goodwill in order to later benefit from their relationship with
the promisee. Examples of trust-building promises include the lavish
128 See, for example, Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract 23-57 (Har-
vard 1994).
129 These categories can overlap. In fact, most gratuitous promises are likely made based on
more than one of the listed motives.
130 These categories build on distinctions made by Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust
in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 Wis L Rev 567, 585-92 (1997).
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gifts law firms bestow on summer associates and the gifts businessmen
make in the hopes of securing an eventual business relationship.13
Similarly, status-enhancing promises are meant to build promisors'
reputations with the outside society. For example, promisors may seek
a reputation for being charitable or for being a good family member,
friend, or community leader. Certain gifts to charities are among the
most obvious forms of status-enhancing gifts, and the status-enhancing
motive likely explains why so few large charitable gifts are made
anonymously." 2 Finally, altruistic promisors care about promisees and
benefit from improving their promisees' welfare. In the language of
economics, these promisors have interdependent utility functions with
the promisees they wish to help.
Promisors may operate out of a combination of two or more of
these motives, but the general point remains that different motives
will dominate for different transactions. To the extent game theory
sheds light on anticommodification norms, these norms will primarily
operate for trust-building and status-enhancing promises.
Looking first to status-enhancing promises, promisors may wish
to be viewed as charitable or to be seen as good friends, family-
members, or participants in other social relationships. In other words,
the status-enhancing motivation often involves promisors seeking to
gain the appearance of being altruistic, whether the altruism is general
or is oriented toward a specific group or purpose. But there is a differ-
ence between being viewed as someone who wants to be seen as
charitable and being viewed as someone who actually is charitable.
Cost-benefit type language can make it appear that a promise is being
made for instrumental purposes. Phrasing a promise in bargain form
can undermine the promise's status-enhancing potential.
Douglas Bernheim has developed a model which supports this
result. 3' Since one's charitable nature is not directly observable, status
seekers try to signal their beneficence by making public gifts. Their
goal is to mimic the actions of those who actually are charitable. As
such, status seekers must take care not to reveal their actual motiva-
tions by departing from the behavior of a truly altruistic donor. If the
status seekers give the appearance that they are trying to gain some-
131 See note 34 and accompanying text.
132 See Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 Am
Econ Rev 1019, 1021 (1996) (showing that anonymous gifts constituted less than 2 percent of the
total donations made to several well-known, large institutions). Of course, not all charitable gifts
will be made for status-seeking purposes; many will be of the altruistic type.
133 See B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J Pol Econ 841,844 (1994) ("When
popularity is sufficiently important relative to intrinsic utility ... many individuals conform to a
single, homogenous standard of behavior, despite heterogeneous underlying preferences.").
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thing in return for their gifts, they may inadvertently reveal their
status-seeking motives. Hence, a specific agreement for a charitable
recipient to publicize a gift or to grant the donor special privileges can
diminish the amount of status the donor receives from the gift. This is
not to suggest that recipient organizations do not publicize gifts or
grant donors special privileges. However, a gift's status-enhancing po-
tential is maximized when the recipients make it appear that they are
publicizing a gift of their own accord, rather than at the request of the
donor. The use of consideration language can render too overt a pro-
misor's motivations in making these gifts.
This problem is not as severe when a status-enhancing promise is
exchanged for a dollar rather than for special privileges granted by the
promisee. Still, the public might wonder why the contracting parties
deem it necessary to go to such lengths to secure a promise through
law. If the promisee believed the promisor to be truly charitable, the
promisee should not worry about the promisor's later reneging. That a
promisee seeks legal assurances that the promise will be fulfilled might
be taken to indicate that the promisee suspects the promisor is status-
seeking rather than altruistic. Consequently, if the parties claim that a
promise is being exchanged for something of actual value, the public
may believe that the promisor is motivated more by the desire to gain
the item of value than by charitable inclinations. But if the parties claim
that a promise is being exchanged for a mere trifle, the public may be-
lieve that the promisee does not trust the promisor's motives. In either
case, voicing consideration can suggest that a promisor merely seeks the
appearance of being charitable rather than actually being charitable.
The same conclusion holds when status-seeking promisors wish to
be known for possessing qualities other than charity. For example,
Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad have constructed a model in which
donors seek to gain status on account of being wealthy'" Since wealth
is not directly observable, and since conspicuous consumption can
only take one so far, these donors try to signal their wealth by making
lavish donations. These donations provide the promisors with a means
of signaling that is both public and too expensive for the less wealthy to
mimic. The moderately wealthy may purchase a yacht if they truly enjoy
yachting, but only the extremely wealthy are likely to donate massive
sums without seeking personal benefit; only the extremely wealthy can
donate on a whim.'5 The moderately wealthy are far more likely to take
precautions to insure that their donations create the intended result.
134 Glazer and Konrad, 86 Am Econ Rev at 1019-21 (cited in note 132).
135 Id at 1020 ("[A] person may want to signal income to several different peer groups. He
may use conspicuous luxury consumption in some status games and may use donations to signal
income to those who cannot see his consumption of luxury goods.").
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As such, when promisors appear to be seeking something in re-
turn for their donations-when the donations are made using the bar-
gain form-the donations may lose some of their potential to signal
extreme wealth. If the promise is exchanged for something of value,
the promisor may be viewed as greatly desiring the item of value
rather than as donating because the costs of doing so are low. And if
the promise is exchanged for something of negligible value, the public
may wonder why the parties felt the need to make their promise legally
binding; perhaps the promisee was concerned the promisor would no
longer be able to afford the promise if her economic situation wors-
ened before performance?
Regardless of what form of status they pursue, status-seeking
promisors cannot reveal the signaling motivations for their promises.
Articulating consideration or using cost-benefit language threatens to
undermine the message these promisors wish to send.
Similar conclusions follow for trust-building promises. Econo-
mists have increasingly come to realize that legal sanctions are insuffi-
cient for monitoring long-term interdependent relationships.'" Courts
simply lack the ability to verify that parties fulfill all aspects of an
agreement in good faith. Colin Camerer uses a signaling model to ex-
plain how parties can make trust-building gifts in order to signal their
reliability as a contractual partner.'37 The gifts serve to distinguish rela-
tionship builders from opportunists, where relationship builders sin-
cerely desire a long-term relationship and opportunists seek to benefit
by taking advantage of the other party's trust. By giving gifts that are
expensive for opportunists to mimic, relationship-builders can demon-
strate their commitment to the donee.
However, if the donors try to negotiate over the terms of a gift or
speak about a gift using cost-benefit language, they may be viewed as
opportunists who are attempting to mimic the signals sent by relation-
ship builders. Even suggesting that the promisee offer a penny in re-
turn for a promise in order to make it legally binding may suggest that
the promisor believes the promisee needs reassurance of the promi-
sor's intentions. The promisee may wonder if the promisor has a repu-
tation for being unreliable that is unknown to the promisee. When
136 See, for example, Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 204-05
(Free Press 1975) ("[U]ltimate recourse [to the courts] does not imply a capacity to make fre-
quent and nuanced adjustments in continuing relations .... [C]ourt ordering often experiences
severe limitations."). More generally, the economics subfield of transaction cost economics is
based on this observation.
137 Colin Camerer, Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols, 94 Am J Soc S180, S199
(1988) ("[Tjhe sociologists' insistence that gifts convey meaning is much like the economists'
idea that gifts are 'signals' of information.").
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parties truly desire long-term cooperative relationships, they must learn
to trust one another for promises that the law cannot enforce. Begin-
ning a relationship with a suggestion that a promise is not trustworthy
unless it can be made legally binding raises questions, at the very least.
Similarly, if promisees try to bargain over the conditions of a gift,
they may be viewed as opportunists who want to take the gift without
being interested in the long-term relationship. Any proposal that bar-
gain-form language be used to invoke the consideration doctrine might
be taken as evidence of insincere behavior. In the words of Eric Posner,
Attempting to bargain over a trust-enhancing gift is terribly im-
proper, as it suggests that the donee is neither a cooperator who
seeks a relationship nor a cooperator who does not seek this par-
ticular relationship, but rather an opportunist seeking to get a
signaling gift at no cost to himself-something that would be in
the interests of no one to admit.'
The social norms against commodifying gift-giving transactions
correspond with the signaling-based motives of status-enhancing and
trust-building promises. For both types of promises, articulating con-
sideration can undermine the signals that the promises are intended to
convey. Game theory explains a process by which the norms against
voicing consideration in giftgiving relationships may have arisen. As
successive generations of parties internalized the appropriate behav-
ior for giftgiving relationships, this behavior may have begun to seem
natural; parties may have forgotten the original rationale for the limi-
tations on what behavior feels suitable for giftgiving transactions.
Even thinking about these transactions using cost-benefit rationales
may have come to feel inappropriate.
Of course, these results are somewhat speculative. We do not
claim that the consideration form is always unavailable for status-
enhancing and trust-building promises. But the evidence from sociol-
ogy and anthropology strongly suggests that there exist categories of
gratuitous promisors who cannot articulate consideration due to social
norms, and the literature from philosophy and political theory pro-
vides additional support for this conclusion. The game theory models
discussed in this section add both further support and another poten-
tial explanation for the proposition. At the very least, the signaling-
based motivations of trust-building and status-enhancing promisors
have probably played a role in the development of the norms against
commodifying giftgiving relationships.
138 E. Posner, 1997 Wis L Rev at 586-87 (cited in note 125).
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D. Drawing Conclusions from the Literature
Controversy rages over the nature and scope of commodification.
Studies of the topic have yet to reach a point for us to accurately pre-
dict when norms will block specific transactions. As such, our discus-
sion of anticommodification norms has been necessarily vague. We
offer few specific examples, and the examples we do give tend to the
extreme-such as transactions over sex or transactions regarding rit-
ual objects in tribal cultures. We use these extreme examples because
they best illustrate our argument.
Nevertheless, we believe that anticommodification norms also
regulate routine transactions that occur throughout society. We believe
these norms frequently govern gift promises given to foster market ex-
changes, as well as promises made within social relationships such as
those between friends, family members, and neighbors. Although the
literature is not sufficiently mature to prove this point, we suspect that
there are also a multitude of transactions made within economic rela-
tionships-particularly among ongoing business partners-for which the
explicit use of bargain-oriented language would be awkward, if not taboo.
Despite the underdeveloped state of the literature, we can still
reach a few conclusions about anticommodification norms. We can be
fairly confident that these norms deter at least some parties from ar-
ticulating consideration. There is widespread agreement that social
spaces exist wherein explicit bargaining is tacitly prohibited. More-
over, the three branches of knowledge make similar predictions about
the general types of transactions for which anticommodification
norms are likely to apply.
Sociologists and anthropologists tell us that noncommodifiable
transactions are highly ritualized, serving primarily to establish social
intimacy or to solidify relationships, as opposed to merely resulting in
a transfer of goods. Similarly, philosophers theorize that anticommodi-
fication norms guard the nonmarket sphere-the norms function to
prevent market forces from corrupting intimate relationships, to shield
goods and relationships infused with inherent dignity from assaults by
market-oriented language and logic, or to block those with market
resources from purchasing power within other spheres of human ac-
tivity. Finally, game theory shows how voicing consideration in trust-
building and status-enhancing transactions can undermine the signal-
ing-based purposes of these transactions.
Although these three branches of knowledge employ different
methodologies, they reach similar results. All three approaches con-
clude that anticommodification norms govern transactions where the
relationships between the transacting parties or the social messages
sent by the transactions are more important than the actual exchange
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of goods or services. Noncommodifiable transactions are ritual ori-
ented or signaling based. They operate within a realm of social activity
in which market logic is subordinated to other purposes, where parties
seek nonmarket values like friendship or esteem. Although the divid-
ing lines are blurry, there exists both a market sphere where commodi-
fying language is fully acceptable and a more relationship-oriented
sphere where such language is taboo. By enforcing only promises
backed by at least nominal consideration, courts can limit legal en-
forcement to promises made within the market sphere while avoiding
entanglement with the personal domain.
Of course, even when norms frown on the use of consideration,
some parties will inevitably ignore these norms and take whatever
steps are required to make their promises legally binding. Moreover,
the content of anticommodification norms is likely to change over
time and amongst subcultures. And consideration may be available
through ritualized "gentleman's agreements" even in circumstances
where other forms of bargain-type behavior would be prohibited.
When looking beyond the extreme cases, we cannot know whether
and to what extent anticommodification norms actually apply.
But this ambiguity supports the central premise of our paper. We
wish to dissuade courts from trying to determine the specific circum-
stances in which promises backed by nominal consideration should be
binding. Instead of creating one rule for option and guarantee promises,
another for interfamilial promises, and further rules for still other type
of promises, we call for a single rule to be applied to all cases. By mak-
ing nominal consideration both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
a promise to be enforced, we would rely on the parties to demonstrate
when they are able to overcome any extant anticommodification norms.
Without further analysis, we cannot evaluate the normative im-
plications of the limits anticommodification norms place on access to
nominal consideration. Looking to the principle of honoring parties'
intentions, it might seem like we should abandon the use of considera-
tion and provide parties with a method for enforcing their promises
that is more readily available. Yet, as the next two Parts will demon-
strate, anticommodification norms only block access to consideration
in circumstances in which parties should generally prefer not to have a
means for making their promises legally binding. In order to under-
stand this counterintuitive argument, we must first address the as-
sumption that parties only choose to make their promises legally obli-
gating when they actually desire the promises to be enforced. The next
Part shows how parties' expressed intentions may not reflect their
underlying desires.
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III. THE PROBLEM OF INEFFICIENT SIGNALING
When starting from the principle of respecting parties' intentions
at the time of contract formation, the consideration doctrine is a bit
puzzling. The doctrine serves to deny legal enforcement even when
the parties clearly wish their promises to be binding. No matter how
unequivocally the parties communicate a desire to be bound, the doc-
trine calls for ignoring the parties' declared wishes unless considera-
tion is present.
The previous Part demonstrated that anticommodification norms
block some parties from invoking nominal consideration. Hence, even
when courts enforce promises backed by nominal consideration, not
all parties can make use of the consideration form. To the extent that
we rely on the consideration doctrine as a means for parties to bind
themselves, the law will sometimes be unable to effectuate parties'
expressed wishes. Under the traditional assumption that parties' ex-
pressed wishes correspond with their true desires, our discussion of
anticommodification norms would cast substantial doubt on the con-
sideration doctrine. After all, anticommodification norms prevent
many parties from invoking consideration even when they want their
promises to be binding. Instead of looking to consideration, perhaps
we should seek a less restrictive form, such as enforcing all promises
where the parties declare in writing a desire for legal enforcement.
But the traditional assumption is flawed; parties' stated intentions
do not necessarily reflect their true desires. Just because a promisor
states her intention to make her promise binding does not mean she
desires the option to be bound. This idea can be illustrated by a simple
example: A professor worries that a few of her students may be con-
fused and thus decides to hold an optional class session at seven
o'clock on a Friday morning. When numerous bleary-eyed students
show up, the professor assumes that more students were confused
than she originally thought and pats herself on the back for being so
generous -after all, the students would not have attended if the costs
of doing so outweighed the benefits. Though the professor sacrificed
her own sleep in order to hold the extra session, she was glad to do so
to assist her students, who obviously needed the extra help, since oth-
erwise they would not have attended the class.
The professor's error is obvious. If she schedules an optional class,
her students may choose to attend it, but this does not necessarily
mean they needed extra help. The attending students may not require
any additional assistance, but may merely seek to prevent the profes-
sor from thinking they are putting in less effort on account of their not
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attending the extra session.' Both the professor and the students may
have been better off without the optional class. The mere fact that stu-
dents choose to attend the class once offered does not indicate that
they wanted the class to be offered in the first place. Contrary to the
professor's beliefs, the principle of honoring students' desires does not
support holding the optional class session.
An analogous dynamic applies to a promisor's choice of whether
to secure her promises through law. When promisors have the option
to legally bind themselves, promisors who choose not to exercise that
option may send a negative signal to promisees about their intention
to perform. Promisors who do not make their promises binding look
insincere compared to those who do. As a result, in order to avoid
looking insincere, promisors may render their promises binding even
though they would prefer not to. When the option for legal enforce-
ment is not available, on the other hand, there is no worry that the
wrong signal will be sent. Nothing about a promisor's intentions can
be deduced from the fact that her promise is not binding.
Like the students who attend the optional class session, promisors
may exercise the option for legal enforcement even if they wish the
option didn't exist. The mere fact that parties choose to employ a le-
gally binding form does not mean that they benefit from the existence
of that form. When promisors have the option to legally secure their
promises in order to demonstrate their sincerity to promisees, they
may actually end up worse off than if no such option existed. To re-
spect parties' true desires might actually require taking away the op-
tion for the legal enforcement of promises.
This Part describes the intuitions behind the problem of inefficient
signaling and outlines the assumptions we use to model the problem.
When inefficient signaling takes place, promisors may bind themselves
even when they would prefer not to have the option to be bound. The
formal analysis proving this result can be found in Appendices A and B.
Appendix A contains the first part of our formal proof. The Ap-
pendix adapts a game theory model developed by Phillippe Aghion
and Benjamin Hermalin.'4 Their work is part of a well-known branch
of scholarship building on an earlier piece by Michael Rothschild and
Joseph Stiglitz. 4 ' We do not present the Aghion-Hermalin model in
139 This result is particularly likely if the professor grades even partially based on student
effort. But the result is possible as long as students suspect that the professor might take her
perception of their effort into account.
140 See generally Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private
Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J L Econ & Org 381 (1990).
141 See generally Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insur-
ance Markets:An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q J Econ 629 (1976).
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full. Instead, we show how the question of enforcing promises fits the
conditions needed for the model to apply. Appendix A forgoes equa-
tions and the direct use of mathematics. Instead, the logic behind the
model is explained through a series of graphs.
Appendix B extends the Aghion-Hermalin analysis by presenting
a model of our own design. The Aghion-Hermalin model proves most
of the results needed for our justification of the consideration doc-
trine, but the model was not designed with the consideration doctrine
in mind and thus leaves gaps in our story. Most importantly, the
Aghion-Hermalin model is unable to show how the creation of a le-
gally binding option can harm promisees as well as promisors. Appen-
dix B remedies this deficiency. Although based on Aghion and Herma-
lin's work, our model in Appendix B is simplified in order to meet the
space requirements of a law journal article. The model should be
viewed as an extension of Aghion and Hermalin's work, not as a piece
of analysis intended to stand on its own.
Although the results of this Part depend on the formal models in
the Appendices for support, the body of this Part provides a concep-
tual explanation of the inefficient signaling problem. We hope this
explanation will suffice for most readers. In order to situate our con-
ceptual overview of the problem, we also explain the major assump-
tions behind our formal models of inefficient signaling.
A. The Assumptions behind Inefficient Signaling Spirals
Before proceeding with our analysis, we need to specify four as-
sumptions underlying our approach. Although these assumptions are
not strictly necessary for the conceptual argument contained in the
body of this Part, we believe it important to explain the assumptions
upon which we base the formal proof for our argument.
Our assumptions are as follows: First, we adopt a welfare-
maximization framework. Second, we employ an offer-acceptance
model. Third, we assume parties have asymmetric information. And
fourth, we define promises and contracts as containing only two terms.
To begin with, we utilize a welfare-maximization framework,
which seeks to maximize the overall benefit to all involved parties -
that is, all promisors and promisees. We use this framework because
we lack cause for prioritizing the desires of specific promisors or pro-
misees. When looking to whether parties would desire to have a le-
gally binding option for a category of promises, we need a method for
determining group preferences in cases where individual members of
the group might disagree. We assume that groups will-or at least
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should -choose the option that maximizes the overall welfare of the
group. We do not concern ourselves with the distribution of gains and
losses amongst the members of a group. 1
2
As our second assumption, we employ an offer-acceptance model
of promising. We view promisors as rationally making offers in order
to obtain some specific benefit. This benefit can be something of
monetary value offered by the promisee in return for the promise.
Alternatively, the benefit can come from altruistic motives or from the
desire to develop trust or status. 14' Regardless, promisors fashion an
offer and then look to see whether they can gain their desired level of
benefit from making the promise. In the case of market exchanges, a
promisor's offer would be followed by the promisee's acceptance or
rejection. If the offer is rejected, the promisor can then fashion a new
offer with different terms. In the case of gratuitous promises, we
model promisors as first deciding the minimum benefit they would
need to receive in order to make promising worthwhile, and then
looking to see whether they would actually receive this benefit from
making the promise. If the expected benefit falls below the minimum
threshold, this counts as a rejection, and the promisors can then repeat
the process by calculating a minimum threshold for a new prom-
ise/offer. Of course, the offer-acceptance approach is not the only
method for modeling promising. The parties might instead bargain
amongst themselves and jointly set the terms of the promise, or gratui-
tous promisors might start by calculating the expected benefit rather
than the minimum threshold. Nevertheless, we employ the offer-
acceptance model because it greatly simplifies our analysis and strikes
us as a reasonable approximation of how many promises are made."
For our third assumption, we specify that parties have asymmetric
information. Specifically, we view promisors as having better informa-
tion about the probability that they will be able to fulfill their promises
than do promisees. Since individuals are generally the best judges of
their future actions, this assumption seems reasonable.' Yet promisees
142 We do not claim that distribution is unimportant as a general matter. When individuals
differ with respect to morally relevant characteristics--such as their existing level of wealth-
distributive concerns may trump the goal of welfare maximization. But we do not view one's
status as a promisor or promisee or one's probability of being able to fulfill a promise as morally
relevant characteristics.
143 See Part II.C.
144 As the modeling task would be prohibitively difficult, we have not tested whether our
results are robust to relaxing the offer/acceptance assumption. But we see no reason for thinking
that our results depend on this assumption.
145 There may be circumstances in which the promisee has better information about the
promisor's likelihood of performance-such as when the promisee can aggregate information
across numerous similarly situated promisors and the promisor does not have access to this
information. Yet exceptions of this sort should be rare.
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only care about promises to the extent they view them as reliable. A
promisee will not generally offer much in exchange for a promise he
believes is unlikely to be fulfilled. Consequently, the benefit promisors
receive from making a promise partially depends on their perceived reli-
ability. This result applies to gratuitous promises as well as to exchange
promises." Unable to assess promisor reliability directly, a promisee
evaluates a promisor's likelihood of performance based on the average
reliability of all promisors with similar observable characteristics.
Since promisors benefit from being viewed as reliable, it is worth
asking why promisors with a high probability of performance cannot
simply communicate that information to promisees. The answer is that
promisors with below-average probabilities of performance may
mimic the communications made by more reliable promisors. A pro-
misor might tell a promisee that she is very likely to perform, but the
promisee cannot know whether the promisor is speaking truthfully or
is falsely attempting to increase the perception of her reliability in
order to gain more from making the promise. Only by taking concrete
actions such as making a promise legally binding can promisors in-
crease their perceived reliability.
Our last assumption-that promises contain only two terms-is
particularly important. We only make this final assumption in order to
demonstrate the conclusions of this Part. Looking ahead to Part IV,
we show how this assumption holds only under certain conditions. We
then show how this fact justifies the consideration doctrine.
With that preface, our fourth assumption defines promises and
contracts as containing only two terms -(1) the size of the promise
and (2) the level of sanctions for breaching. The size of the promise
refers to the amount a promisor pledges to the promisee. Equivalently,
the term measures the value the promisee receives if the promise is
fulfilled. The level of sanctions refers to the negative consequences to
the promisor in the case of breach. Sanctions include any damages
imposed by law as well as any stigma that would result from social
norms against breach. In order to build the models described in this
Part, we assume that these terms completely define the content of all
promises and contracts.
146 For both trust-building and status-enhancing gratuitous promises, the promisee and the
outside society are more likely to respect promises viewed as reliable over promises viewed as
likely to result in default. Being perceived as reliable results in an immediate benefit, as the
promisors can gain more trust or status for the same cost. The picture is more complicated for
altruistic promisors, but even these promisors care about their perceived reliability to the extent
they wish their promisees to engage in beneficial reliance-which is the primary purpose for
making an altruistic promise to deliver a future benefit, rather than merely conveying that bene-
fit at the future date.
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We make a few additional assumptions when constructing the
formal models in our Appendices, but those additional assumptions are
less important for understanding the intuitions behind our results."7
B. A Conceptual Explanation of Inefficient Signaling Spirals
As a consequence of asymmetric information, promisors may be
more or less reliable than they are perceived to be. Promisors whose
actual reliability exceeds their perceived reliability may seek means
for convincing promisees of their greater-than-average likelihood of
performance. Given the option of having their promises legally en-
forced, these promisors might agree to bind themselves."' There are
costs to entering a legally binding form. The world is unpredictable
and no promisor can be completely certain that she will still wish to
fulfill her promise at the appropriate future date. Securing a promise
as a binding contract forces the promisor to bear costs in the event
that she is unable - or unwilling - to perform. Nevertheless, the contrac-
tual form may still be attractive when the benefit from increasing per-
ceived reliability exceeds the cost of potentially paying legal damages.
Following this logic, the conventional accounts claim that parties
should be allowed to legally bind themselves because promisors will only
147 It is also worth noting another assumption underlying our analysis-that promisors will
not signal through other means when prevented from making their promises legally binding. As
Aghion and Hermalin write, it remains uncertain "whether restricting only a subset of signals can
improve efficiency." 6 J L Econ & Org at 404 (cited in note 140). If promisors responded to the
lack of a legally binding option by hiring the mob to enforce their promises, this outcome would
clearly be worse than the inefficient signaling spirals created by legal enforcement. Promisors
might conceivably engage in a variety of costly behaviors designed to signal their reliability.
Yet making a promise legally binding is an exceptionally strong signal. To a large extent, the
prospect of paying expectation damages effectively raises a promisor's reliability to 100 percent.
Factoring in litigation costs lowers the promisees' eventual recovery, but also provides an addi-
tional deterrent to promisors. Only alternatives like mob enforcement are likely to have any-
where near this strength, and we doubt that more than a tiny fraction of promisors will employ
alternatives of this sort. As such, we feel reasonably comfortable modeling promisors as lacking
alternative signals.
Moreover, looking ahead, promisors who are willing to use extreme alternative forms of sig-
naling are unlikely to avoid articulating consideration merely on account of anticommodification
norms. As we discuss in Part IV.C.1, the consideration doctrine makes a legally binding option
available for promisors who care sufficiently about securing their promises to ignore any taboos
against the use of bargain-form language. The set of promisors who will be deterred by anticom-
modification norms despite being willing to employ costly alternatives to legal enforcement is
likely to be sufficiently small so as to not be worth noticing.
148 This result corresponds with Steven Shavell. An Economic Analysis of Altruism and
Deferred Gifts, 20 J Legal Stud 401 (1991). Yet Shavell's model only includes two types of promi-
sors-sincere promisors and masqueraders who have no intention of performing. See id at 415-
19. As such, Shavell's conclusions are directly opposite to ours. We owe Shavell a debt of grati-
tude for inspiring our own analysis, but his model is ultimately flawed due to its failure to recog-
nize that even sincere promisors can differ with respect to their probability of performance.
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exercise this option if the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. Thus con-
ceived, the existence of a legally binding form does not influence a pro-
misor's wishes-it merely effectuates them. But what this account ig-
nores is that creating a legally binding form can diminish the per-
ceived reliability of promises that are not made pursuant to that form.
Imagine a group of promisors with an average probability of per-
formance of 80 percent. Some promisors will have a higher likelihood
of performance, and others will have a lower one. But promisees, un-
able to distinguish relatively reliable promisors from unreliable ones,
will view any member of the group as having an expected likelihood
of performance of 80 percent. Now imagine that some of these promi-
sors secure their promises as legally binding contracts while others do
not. All else being equal, the promisors who take advantage of the
legally binding option should have a lower-than-average chance of
default. This is because promisors with a relatively low probability of
default can enter a legally binding form with far lest cost, as there is
less chance that they will end up being subject to legal sanctions. Once
the most reliable promisors choose to bind themselves, the remaining
pool of (nonbound) promisors will be viewed as having an increased
average likelihood of default. In other words, allowing relatively reli-
able promisors to differentiate themselves from the general group will
lead promisees to assign a reduced likelihood of performance to any
promisors who refuse to employ the legally binding form.
This process can create a harmful spiral. If promisors with a 90
percent chance of performance sign contracts in order to differentiate
themselves from a group with an average performance rate of 80 per-
cent, the remaining members of the group might be seen as having
only a 70 percent chance of performance (the average probability of
the now-smaller group). This reduced assessment of reliability might
then cause the promisors with an 80 percent chance of performance to
sign contracts in order to differentiate themselves from the new group
average of 70 percent, thereby further reducing the assessed reliability
of the remaining members of the group. Continuing the pattern, pro-
misors with a 70 percent chance of performance might sign contracts
in order to differentiate themselves from the new 60 percent average,
and so on. Figure 1 depicts this process pictorially.
1344 [73:1299
Commodification and Contract Formation
FIGURE 1: THE SIGNALING SPIRAL
Not Bound Bound
Step 1: No promisors
are bound
Average likelihood of
performance: 80%
Step 2: Promisors with >80%
> 80% likelihood of
performance choose to
bind themselves
Remaining avg.: 70%
Step 3: Promisors with 70-80%
70-80% likelihood of
performance choose to
bind themselves
Remaining avg.: 60%
Step 4: Promisors with 60- 6 70
70% likelihood of per-
formance choose to bind
themselves Remaining avg.: 50%
In this fashion, promisors can essentially be forced into adopting a
legally binding form. Even when many, or even most, of the promisors
would prefer for there not to be a legally binding option, once that op-
tion exists the promisors may feel obliged to exercise it. Consequently,
promisors may well prefer not to have the option to bind themselves.
As Ian Ayres describes the inefficient signaling phenomenon, the
"inefficiency of signaling stems not only from the efforts of [reliable
promisors] to signal but also from the efforts of [unreliable promisors]
to falsely match those signals which cause the [reliable promisors] to
run even further away from the efficient contracting point..1.9 Ayres
continues by analogizing inefficient signaling to Dr. Seuss's parable
about the Sneetches:
149 Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U Cin L Rev 387, 400
(1991). Ayres is discussing corporate charters rather than contract formation, but his description
of the Aghion-Hermalin model for inefficient signaling remains valid.
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High-status Sneetches had stars on their bellies and low-status
Sneetches did not. As the tale unfolds, vast inefficiencies are gen-
erated as the low-status Sneetches try to match the high-status
ones by affixing stars to their bellies and the high-status Sneetches
try to further distinguish themselves by then removing their stars.
The moral of the story is that finding credible signals may be ex-
tremely hard and that the mere attempt to distinguish yourself
whether or not it succeeds can generate social inefficiencies.15 °
In addition to harming promisors, the creation of a legally binding
form can also harm promisees. Promisors should only make promises
when their benefit from doing so exceeds their costs. Regardless of
whether a promisor seeks something of material value in exchange for a
promise, seeks increased trust or status, or seeks to altruistically enhance
the welfare of a promisee, the promisor will only bind herself when do-
ing so can be expected to result in her obtaining enough additional
benefit from promising to compensate for the costs of potentially pay-
ing sanctions if she ultimately needs to default. In the absence of signal-
ing motivations, promisors should size their promises so as to maximize
their expected benefit from promising while minimizing their costs.
By reducing the perceived reliability of promisors who choose
not to bind themselves, signaling spirals force promisors to either re-
duce their expected benefits or else increase their expected costs. If
the promisors refuse to bind themselves, they will receive less benefit
from promising on account of their lower perceived reliability. But if
the promisors do choose to bind themselves, their costs will increase
due to the prospect of legal sanctions. In either case, signaling spirals
can make promising less attractive to promisors.
Some promisors will decide that this less attractive value proposi-
tion no longer justifies promising. When the benefits of promising are
reduced, the benefits may no longer exceed the costs, causing some
promisors to leave the promising game altogether. Other promisors
will reduce the size of their promises so as to lower their potential
costs if they end up needing to pay damages. Through a combination
of these reactions, signaling spirals can reduce the overall value of
what promisors offer to promisees. In this manner, signaling spirals
can harm promisees as well as promisors.
This Part has attempted to provide a conceptual overview of the
logic behind signaling spirals. Again, we prove these results through
formal models in the Appendices. But it is important to realize that
not all signaling spirals are inefficient. The goal of this Part was to
150 Id, describing Dr. Seuss, The Sneetches and Other Stories 1-25 (1961).
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demonstrate that allowing promisors to bind themselves does not nec-
essarily benefit either promisors or promisees. In some instances, even
parties who choose to make their promises legally obligating would
prefer not having the option to do so. But in other circumstances, the
benefits of allowing promisors to back their promises through law
should exceed the costs.
Without further analysis, we cannot distinguish the circumstances
where parties would benefit from having a legally binding option from
the circumstances where providing this option would be harmful. All
we can know is that the mere fact that parties take advantage of a le-
gally obligating form does not mean that they benefit from the exis-
tence of that form. The traditional assumption that parties' expressed
intentions necessarily reflect their true desires is flawed. There is a
difference between one's actions when confronted with a legal rule
and one's preferences for what the legal rule should be.
IV. TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE
CONSIDERATION DOCTRINE
We have now demonstrated the flaws in two assumptions under-
lying traditional accounts of the consideration doctrine: Part II dem-
onstrated that not all parties who might wish to do so can back their
promises with nominal consideration. Part III showed that the mere
fact that parties utilize an option for making their promises legally
binding does not imply that they desire the existence of this option.
Part III argued that parties' expressed intentions do not necessarily
conform to their underlying desires. Yet if we cannot look to parties'
expressed intentions for determining whether they want to be bound,
to what can we look? Must we abandon any hope that contract law
might honor parties' wishes?
Our new account of the consideration doctrine synthesizes the
analysis from the previous two Parts. On a general level, we advocate
using nominal consideration as a mechanism for determining when
bargaining is limited by anticommodification norms. Although the
dividing lines are blurry, anticommodification norms separate a mar-
ket-oriented sphere of interactions in which parties can bargain over
their promises from a relationship-oriented sphere in which parties
face severe limitations on their ability to bargain. We argue that the
law should only enforce promises made within the market-oriented
sphere. When anticommodification norms prevent parties from bar-
gaining, the law should not allow these parties to bind themselves.
Our account is in some respects similar to the substantive theo-
ries discussed in Part I. Yet where substantive theorists have called on
courts to strike down promises backed only by nominal consideration,
we would enforce these promises. The reason substantive theorists
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wish to deny enforcement to promises backed only by nominal con-
sideration is to prevent gratuitous promisors from binding themselves
by dressing their promises in bargain-form language. But as we have
shown, nominal consideration will generally be unavailable to promi-
sors operating wholly within the nonmarket sphere. To the extent that
substantive theorists seek only to block enforcement of promises
made within the relationship-oriented sphere, they need not oppose
the enforcement of promises backed by nominal consideration.
As we argued in Part I, substantive accounts are mistaken in their
belief that consideration-backed promises are inherently more deserv-
ing of legal support. So why then do we favor denying enforcement to
promises that lack even nominal consideration? Our answer is formal-
ist in nature. We justify nominal consideration as the best mechanism
for determining which promises parties actually desire to make binding.
Our game theory analysis described in Part III relied on the as-
sumption that promises and contracts contained only two terms. Yet
this assumption does not hold for promises made within the market-
oriented sphere. When parties are able to bargain-where anticom-
modification norms do not apply-they are also able to design con-
tracts using more than two terms. In addition to the terms previously
discussed-the size of the promise and the level of sanctions-these
parties should also be able to specify their promises' scope and level
of return payments. We will define both of these terms later in this
Part."' In brief, the "scope" of a promise refers to the circumstances
under which a promisor's performance will be excused. And "return
payments" refers to what a promisee gives in exchange for a prom-
ise -in other words, the consideration.
Crucially, our analysis from Part III does not apply when parties
can negotiate over a promise's scope and return payments. When par-
ties are able to overcome anticommodification norms and dress their
promises as bargains, we can generally conclude that the parties would
benefit from having their promises legally enforced. For promises
made within the market-oriented sphere, the fact that parties choose
to use a legally binding form generally does indicate that they desire
the existence of this form.
Our account thus seeks to distinguish between the market- and
relationship-oriented spheres, not for substantive reasons, but for for-
malist purposes. Only within the market-oriented sphere can a form
like nominal consideration provide parties with an effective mecha-
nism for communicating when they truly wish to be bound.
151 See Part IV.A.
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To complete our argument, we turn last to promises made wholly
within the relationship-oriented sphere-promises for which anti-
commodification norms prevent the parties from using even a pre-
tense of the bargain form. For these promises, legal formalisms cannot
adequately determine the parties' actual desires. Unlike market-
oriented promisors, relationship-oriented promisors cannot negotiate
over a promise's scope or its level of return payments. With only two
terms available for characterizing their promises, these parties are
subject to the inefficient signaling spirals described in Part III. When
parties are unable to bargain, any mechanism we might give them to
legally bind themselves could end up enforcing promises that the par-
ties would prefer to leave nonbinding.
Moreover, a number of tiebreaking factors further support our
position of not enforcing promises where anticommodification norms
block the use of nominal consideration: These promises are adminis-
tratively costly to enforce. And, to the extent that we believe the phi-
losophical arguments against commodification, enforcing these prom-
ises might advance the forces of market imperialism, damaging non-
market values and relationships. Perhaps most importantly, relation-
ship-oriented promises are made within a complicated web of per-
sonal interactions and interlocking obligations. Due to the same anti-
commodification norms that make bargaining impossible, many of the
parameters of these relationships are unstated. Enforcing these prom-
ises might cause injustice to the parties by making some commitments
legally obligating while other, unstated, return commitments remain
outside the legal domain. Combined with our inability to know
whether parties actually desire nonmarket promises to be enforced,
these tiebreaking factors militate against providing legal support for
promises not backed by even nominal consideration.
To summarize, unlike the substantive accounts that seek to deny
enforcement to gratuitous promises, we value the consideration doc-
trine for its potential to identify the circumstances in which bargain-
form language is socially permissible. Only when parties can bargain
without violating anticommodification norms do we accept the for-
malist position that the law should honor parties' intentions as ex-
pressed at the time of contract formation. For only within this market-
oriented sphere can we conclude that parties who utilize a form like
nominal consideration actually desire to make their promises binding.
A. Relaxing the Assumption that Promises Have Only Two Terms
The consideration doctrine creates an option for the legal en-
forcement of promises in contexts where parties can voice considera-
tion and denies this option where norms block the use of considera-
tion. The doctrine must thus be justified against two potential alterna-
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tives - denying enforcement to a larger set of promises and permitting
a larger set of promises to be enforced. This Part argues in favor of al-
lowing parties to make certain gratuitous promises enforceable against
the alternative of denying enforcement to all gratuitous promises. In
other words, the Part argues for enforcing promises backed only by
nominal consideration as opposed to requiring substantial considera-
tion or an even more restrictive legal form. Parts IV.A and IV.B com-
plete the analysis by arguing against enforcing promises where parties
cannot voice even nominal consideration.
When describing inefficient signaling spirals in Part III, we as-
sumed that promises consisted of only two terms-the level of sanc-
tions and the size of the promise. Inefficient signaling occurred when
the promisors attempted to signal their reliability by making their
promises legally binding (by increasing their level of sanctions). Since
increasing the level of sanctions raises the costs to promisors of making
a promise, these costs must be offset by adjustments made to the other
contracting terms. Under our previous assumption of only two terms,
promisors decreased the size of their promises whenever signaling
caused them to make their promises legally binding. These reductions
in the size of promises diminished welfare, as they caused promisors to
depart from their optimal bundle of terms for signaling purposes.
If we relax the assumption of only two contracting terms, promi-
sors can adjust more than just the size of a promise when compensat-
ing for raising the level of sanctions. In addition to the size of a prom-
ise and the level of sanctions, promises may consist of two other
terms-the promise's scope and its level of return payments.
Scope relates to the conditions under which performance will oc-
cur. A promisor might qualify his promise by listing the circumstances
that will lead to nonperformance -for example, "I promise to take
you to Disneyland, unless I lose my job, the Red Sox make the play-
offs, or a relative dies." By narrowing the scope of a promise, promi-
sors reduce the costs to themselves of making the promise and the
value the promise confers on the promisees. In the event that a scope-
reducing event takes place, the promisor need neither fulfill the prom-
ise nor be subject to sanctions. In contrast, a reduction in the size of a
promise might entail taking the promisee to a local amusement park
instead of to Disneyland. Size adjustments affect the value of what is
delivered under all circumstances, while scope adjustments affect the
conditions under which the promise must be carried out.
"Return payments" is our term for anything offered by the pro-
misee in order to induce the promise-in other words, the considera-
tion. For promises made as part of a market exchange, the promisor's
desire for return payments forms their primary motivation for enter-
ing into the promise. Without return payments, exchange-oriented
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promises would not take place. Although gratuitous promisors are
primarily motivated by something other than the desire for return
payments, they may still value return payments.
For the purposes of this Part, we evaluate return payments as a
promise term rather than as a mechanism for inducing promisors to
make a promise. As a promise term, return payments can be adjusted
in order to trade off with the other terms. If the parties wish to raise
the level of sanctions without reducing the size of the promise, they
can instead raise the level of return payments. Consequently, as we use
the term, return payments must be different in nature from what the
promisor offers the promisee. If a promisor is offering to give the
promisee $100 at a future date, a return payment cannot consist of the
promisee giving $10 back at the same date. In this case, offering the
return payment would be equivalent to reducing the size of the prom-
ise by $10. In contrast, a promisee's offer to deliver $10 now as partial
consideration for a future promise of a $100 could constitute a return
payment. The key difference between these scenarios is that the par-
ties might have different preferences for how they value money now
as opposed to money at the future date. Return payments must be
different in nature from the promised goods or services; the parties
must have different preferences for tradeoffs between the return
payments and the size of the promise. If the parties have the same
preferences for tradeoffs between the return payments and the prom-
ised goods or services, adjustments to return payments would be
equivalent to adjusting the size of the promise. Only when return
payments are different in nature from the promised goods or services
can they function as a separate term.
Our argument that parties who can invoke nominal consideration
are not subject to inefficient signaling spirals is based on two claims.
First, the potential for offering return payments and scope adjustments
alleviates the harm from this type of signaling. Second, there is a sub-
stantial overlap between the contexts in which parties can articulate
consideration and the contexts in which parties can make return pay-
ments and scope adjustments. Where anticommodification norms pre-
vent the use of consideration, the same norms will usually block parties
from making return payments or scope adjustments. As such, signaling
spirals will typically only be costly when consideration is unavailable.
1. The effects of multiple terms.
In the absence of signaling considerations. promisors should size
their promises so as to minimize their costs while maximizing the
value conferred on their promisees. The promisors should likewise
select a level of sanctions that minimizes their costs while maximizing
value to their promisees. Promisors only depart from this optimal
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bundle of terms in order to signal their reliability. When signaling
leads promisors to raise their level of sanctions above the optimal
level (by making their promises legally binding), the promisors must
compensate by adjusting the other terms of their promise so that their
costs do not exceed the benefit they receive from promising.
Under our previous assumption of only two terms, signaling-
based increases in the level of sanctions forced promisors to reduce
the size of their promises. These departures from the promises' opti-
mal sizes create harms for both promisors and promisees.
In most promises, transferring the promised goods or services in-
creases value for the promisee more than it decreases value for the
promisor. This result is most clear for exchange-oriented promises.
Exchange-oriented promisors should only offer their promised goods
or services if they value them less than what the promisees offer in
return. Similarly, the promisees should only accept a promise if they
value what is promised above what they give up in exchange for the
promise. That promisees and promisors have different value functions
is what makes exchanges welfare enhancing. This value-creating func-
tion of market exchanges lies at the heart of economic theory.
Altruistic promises present a more complicated picture. Never-
theless, promisors should only promise if they prefer that the promisee
have the promised goods or services rather than maintaining posses-
sion themselves. When we combine the value promisors receive from
interdependent utility with the value promisees gain from receiving the
promise, altruistic promises create value just as market exchanges do. '
For both altruistic and exchange-oriented promises, transferring
the promised goods or services creates value for society. Whether the
same result holds true for trust-building and status-enhancing prom-
ises is unclear, as we will discuss. However, as we explained previously,
promisors making trust-building and status-enhancing promises will
often be unable to articulate consideration. "3 This section argues for
enforcing gratuitous promises where parties can voice consideration
against the alternative of not enforcing any gratuitous promises. As
such, for the purposes of this section, we can ignore trust-building and
status-enhancing promises. The majority of promises for which consid-
eration is socially available will be dominated by altruistic or ex-
change-oriented motives. For ritualized or signaling-based promises,
the transfer of goods or services plays a secondary role to the mes-
sages the promises convey. In contrast, altruistic and exchange-oriented
promises are primarily concerned with the actual transfer of the goods
152 See Part I.B.1 for more on this point.
153 See Part II.C.
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or services. For these promises, the transfer of goods or services from
the promisor to the promisee creates value.
The opposite relationship holds for return payments. At a mini-
mum, we have no reason to think that promisees value the goods or
services offered as return payments more than promisors do. If money
is used as a return payment, for example, we might assume that the
parties value the money equally. Consider a promisor who offers to
drive a promisee to the airport. If the promise were made legally en-
forceable, the promisor might need to reduce the size of the promise
in order to compensate for the costs of entering the legally binding
form. Perhaps the promisor would offer to drive the promisee only to
the nearest bus station, forcing the promisee to take the bus the rest of
the way to the airport. Since the promisor would have been willing to
drive the promisee all the way to the airport in the absence of sanc-
tions, we can assume it costs less for the promisor to drive the pro-
misee to the airport than it does for the promisee to take the bus.
Hence, if return payments were available, the promisee might offer ten
dollars in exchange for the promisor's driving her all the way to the air-
port. If the parties can agree on a return payment that can induce the
promisor to maintain the original size of her promise (a ride all the way
to the airport) despite the costs of entering the legally binding form,
this new outcome will be a Pareto improvement over the alternative -a
reduction in the size of the promise (a ride only to the bus station). The
promisee should value being driven all the way to the airport more
than the money given as a return payment, and the promisor should
value the return payment above the costs of the additional driving.
Moreover, this example actually understates our argument. When
something other than money is used as a return payment, there is
every reason to think promisees will offer something that the promi-
sors value more than they do. Rational promisees should offer what-
ever return payment they have available that maximizes the benefit
conferred on promisors at the minimum cost to the promisee. In the
airport example, the promisee might offer to watch the promisor's
kids, to give the promisor guitar lessons, or to provide some other
good or service that the promisee can offer at below-market costs. Con-
sequently, signaling through the use of return payments does not create
the same harms as signaling through reductions in the size of a promise.
Signaling through scope adjustments also avoids the harms from
reducing a promise's size. The conclusions in Part III relied on the as-
sumption of asymmetric information. Promisors only engage in ineffi-
cient signaling when they cannot directly communicate their probabil-
ity of performance to promisees. Under conditions of symmetric in-
formation, there are no incentives for inefficient signaling, and promi-
sors should offer welfare-maximizing combinations of terms. Promi-
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sors only depart from the welfare-maximizing bundle of terms in or-
der to signal their reliability.
By making scope adjustments, promisors can directly communi-
cate information about their probability of performance. This commu-
nication is not perfect, and excessive use of scope adjustments can
lead to inefficiencies. But scope adjustments still avoid the harms as-
sociated with reducing a promise's size.
The reason promisors cannot directly communicate information
about their reliability without scope adjustments is that unreliable
promisors face incentives to mimic what is said by reliable promisors.
Scope adjustments specify conditions under which a promise will not
be performed. When reliable promisors make scope adjustments in
order to compensate for increasing their level of sanctions, they ex-
plain circumstances that would cause them to renege on the promise.
Facing incentives to mimic the statements of reliable promisors, unre-
liable promisors may make similar scope adjustments.
Still, unreliable promisors should not need to specify the same
exact conditions for nonperformance as reliable promisors. Multiple
reliable promisors may differ in the exact circumstances under which
they would be unable to perform. Reliability is an aggregate charac-
teristic. Two promisors are equally reliable when the sum of their
probabilities of nonperformance due to various conditions is the same;
the exact composition of the individual nonperformance conditions
need not be identical. Unreliable promisors should thus only need to
mimic reliable promisors with regard to their aggregate probability of
nonperformance. They can specify nonperformance conditions freely
as long as they do not exceed the aggregate probability expressed by
reliable promisors. Since unreliable promisors may mimic the aggre-
gate reliability conveyed by reliable promisors, scope adjustments
cannot create symmetric information. Promisors still cannot directly
convey their probability of performance. Yet the key point remains
that scope adjustments communicate some information about nonper-
formance conditions.
Promisees benefit from knowing the composition of promisors'
nonperformance conditions even when they do not know whether the
specified conditions are the only circumstances under which the pro-
misor will not perform or the aggregate probability of performance.
Knowing some of the conditions under which a promisor might re-
nege can help the promisee to take precautions against default. The
probability associated with each condition may not remain constant
over time. If a promise is to be fulfilled two years after it was formed,
the promisee may wish to reevaluate the probability of performance at
the end of year one. To the extent the promisee knows some of the con-
ditions under which nonperformance is likely to occur, she can better
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estimate the new aggregate likelihood of breach. If a promisor specifies
a nonperformance condition that she will not drive the promisor to
the airport if there is ice on the road, the promisee can check the
weather forecast the day before and thereby determine whether she
needs to order a cab. Reassessments of this sort made after the time of
promising do not affect promisor welfare. But the promisees can bene-
fit from being able to better decide the degree to which the promise
should be relied on. Overall welfare increases to the extent promisees
can avoid relying too much or too little. Specification of scope condi-
tions helps promisees rely optimally.
The overall effects of signaling-based scope adjustments depend
on the reason the promisors failed to specify these scope conditions
prior to signaling. One possibility is that, with sanctions low, the pro-
misors preferred not to reveal information that might cause the pro-
misees to lower their assessments of the promisors' reliability. All else
being equal, a promisee might assign a lower probability of perform-
ance to promisors specifying scope conditions than to promisors who
do not specify these conditions. After all, specifying a scope condition
involves admitting at least one potential circumstance under which the
promisor will not perform. But once signaling forces these promisors to
make their promise legally binding, the prospect of facing legal sanc-
tions in the event of breach may overwhelm their concern about wors-
ening the perception of their reliability in the eyes of the promisees.
To the extent this forms the reason that promisors fail to specify
scope conditions in the absence of signaling, signaling-based scope
adjustments clearly increase welfare. Specifying the scope conditions
does not decrease the magnitude of what the promisor actually in-
tends to deliver, but only involves the promisor conveying information
about the circumstances under which she is likely to breach. This con-
veyance of information to the promisees helps them rely optimally
and thereby improves welfare.
However, promisors might face costs in analyzing their nonper-
formance conditions. At some level, evaluating all of the circumstances
under which the promisor would need to breach might not be cost
effective. Or signaling might cause promisors to specify scope condi-
tions for circumstances where they might have actually performed in
the absence of signaling concerns. Hence, the potential for scope ad-
justments might not completely alleviate the potential harms from sig-
naling spirals. But, at a minimum, scope adjustments should greatly
minimize these harms. And if signaling causes promisors to make value-
enhancing scope specifications that they would otherwise have been
unwilling to reveal, these scope adjustments might even make the sig-
naling spirals efficient. Whereas size adjustments reduce the potential
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gains from trade, scope adjustments provide information that can im-
prove promisee welfare.
Together, the potential for return payments and scope adjust-
ments should alleviate most of the harms from inefficient signaling,
and may even cause this signaling to be efficient. Where size adjust-
ments reduce overall welfare, return payments and scope adjustments
may enhance welfare. At the very least, adjusting these terms should
not create anywhere near as much harm as size reductions create.'
1
Once we relax the assumption of only two terms, signaling spirals
no longer present a significant cause for concern. When return pay-
ments and scope adjustments are available, we can return to the stan-
dard assumption that parties benefit when the law enforces their mu-
tually agreed-upon statements made at the time of contract formation.
Promisors should only make promises when they benefit from doing
so, and promisees should only accept the promises when they likewise
benefit. Promises made with multiple terms enhance social welfare by
transferring the promised goods or services to the parties who value
them the most or who have the greatest need for them, while permitting
promisees to rely adequately on the promisor's ultimate performance.
2. The availability of multiple terms.
Having satisfied ourselves that the potential for multiple terms
alleviates the harm from signaling spirals, we need to determine the
circumstances under which promises can be characterized by multiple
terms. Our answer is simple: multiple terms will generally be available
in the same contexts in which parties can invoke consideration. When
anticommodification norms prevent parties from articulating consid-
eration, these norms will often obstruct return payments and scope
adjustments as well.
The reasons for this are readily apparent in the case of return
payments. Consideration is a form of return payment. When a pro-
misee offers consideration in exchange for a promise, she is by defini-
tion offering a return payment. The consideration doctrine can only be
activated when the parties claim that a promise is being given in ex-
154 Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that promisors face increasing marginal costs
from making adjustments to any one term. Even if return payments and scope adjustments were
just as harmful as size adjustments, the ability to adjust these terms might still mitigate some of
the harm from inefficient signaling. To the extent adjusting terms produces increasing marginal
costs, more welfare is lost from a second reduction to the size of a promise than from a first
adjustment of equivalent magnitude, with even more welfare lost by a third adjustment. If the
promisors can split their adjustments across multiple terms, instead of adjusting only the size of
the promise, less welfare may be lost even when equivalently sized adjustments to any one of the
terms would be equally costly.
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change for a return payment/consideration. When social norms permit
parties to discuss return payments explicitly, they should also allow the
parties to use return payments as a term of the promise. The act of
bargaining entails a discussion of the amount of consideration, which
effectively makes the level of return payments a term of the promise.
Nevertheless, we might imagine circumstances in which return
payments are available but consideration is not. In order to invoke the
consideration doctrine, the parties must explicitly acknowledge the
consideration/return payment. If the parties were permitted to make
return payments, but not to explicitly acknowledge these return pay-
ments, the consideration doctrine would still be unavailable.
Yet using return payments as a term of a promise requires com-
munication between the promisor and promisee. The promisee must
offer the return payments in exchange for the promisor maintaining
the size of the promise. It is hard to imagine communications of this
sort taking place in contexts in which consideration is unavailable.
Where parties can negotiate explicitly, they should be able to discuss
tradeoffs between return payments and the size of the promise. Where
the parties cannot negotiate explicitly- where consideration is un-
available-the parties will often find it impossible to negotiate over
the level of return payments as a term of the promise.
A similar logic applies to scope adjustments. The reason consid-
eration is often unavailable is that cost-benefit language can com-
modify a promise. As Jane Baron writes, "[E]conomic transfers call for
detached, analytic deliberation in quantitative, cost-benefit terms
which are inappropriate to the emotional and moral realm of gifts."'-"
Expressing a long list of conditions under which a promise will not be
performed is the epitome of cost-benefit language.
Consider our previous discussion of the economic logic behind
trust-building promises.'6 In some relationships, courts are unable to
effectively monitor whether the parties cooperate in the manner re-
quired by the relationship. In place of legal sanctions, the parties rely on
mutual trust. The use of consideration and cost-benefit language in
trust-building promises violates the spirit of the relationship. Promisors
are expected to fulfill promises to the best of their ability, and pro-
misees are expected to understand if circumstances arise that make the
promisor unable to perform. 7 Perhaps promisors can permissibly in-
form promisees if there are particularly noteworthy circumstances un-
der which performance would be impossible. But attempts to negoti-
155 Baron, 64 Ind L J at 196 (cited in note 86).
156 See Part II.C.
157 See Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 61 (cited in note 47) ("Disputes are frequently settled
without reference to the contract or potential or actual legal sanctions.").
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ate tradeoffs between scope conditions and the size of the promise, or
indications that the promisor is trading off between these terms, sug-
gest a cost-benefit mentality inappropriate for trust-building purposes.
Looking back to our discussion of anticommodification norms in
philosophy and political theory, the explicit specification of duties
within intimate relationships was thought to corrupt the meaning of
those relationships. 8 Evaluating in advance whether performance is
cost effective under myriad circumstances implies that a relationship
is valued as a means rather than as an end. Specifying scope conditions
signals that the value of the relationship is finite and definable, that the
costs of maintaining the relationship can be traded off against other
potential uses for the resources invested in the relationship. In circum-
stances where anticommodification norms block the use of consideration,
the norms are likely to prevent the use of scope adjustments as well.
As anthropologists and sociologists have explained, even thinking
about noncommodifiable relationships in cost-benefit terms can seem
inappropriate. '59 Yet specifying scope conditions requires the promisor
to evaluate the predicted costs of performance under various circum-
stances and to weigh these costs against the benefit to be obtained
from making the promise -or from making the promise a certain size.
When norms block the use of cost-benefit thinking and language, par-
ties will often lack the capacity to engage in this sort of reasoning.
We do not mean to overstate our case. We do not claim that there
is a perfect relationship between social contexts in which considera-
tion is unavailable and contexts in which norms prevent return pay-
ments and scope adjustments. Social norms are complex and circum-
stance dependent. Any attempt to describe the content of norms at a
general level is likely to be oversimplified. Yet we have reason to ex-
pect a substantial overlap between the circumstances in which consid-
eration is unavailable and the circumstances in which parties cannot
make return payments or scope adjustments. Consideration is a form
of return payment; scope adjustments can only be made using a cost-
benefit mentality that anticommodification norms are designed to
block. When parties are able to articulate consideration, there is every
reason to believe they will also be able to negotiate return payments
and scope adjustments. When social norms block parties from voicing
consideration, these norms will typically prevent return payments and
scope adjustments as well.
As such, any harms caused by signaling spirals will tend to be
minimal under circumstances where consideration is socially available.
158 See Part II.B.
159 See Part II.A.
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The consideration doctrine divides promisor-promisee relationships
into two categories: a first category in which voicing consideration is
possible and the parties are likely to be able to make return payments
and scope adjustments, and a second category in which social norms
prevent the articulation of consideration and likely obstruct the use of
return payments and scope adjustments as well. A legally binding op-
tion is only granted for the first category, the category of circum-
stances in which inefficient signaling spirals are unlikely to occur.
B. Circumstances in Which Consideration Is Unavailable
When contracting parties are able to voice consideration, they
should typically be able to make scope adjustments and return pay-
ments, thus alleviating the potential harm from signaling spirals. But
what about promises for which norms block the use of considera-
tion-promises for which inefficient signaling can pose a significant
cause for concern?
Part III shows that allowing a legally binding option for these
promises can harm both promisors and promisees. But the Part does
not show whether, on balance, allowing legal enforcement actually
does harm the promisors and promisees. It concludes only that the
welfare effects of a legally binding option are uncertain, that we can-
not simply assume that parties desire the existence of this option
based on their exercising the option.
Whether an option for legal enforcement of promises enhances
or diminishes welfare depends on a variety of factors, including the
promisors' probabilities of performance, the potential benefits from
increasing promisee reliance, and the magnitude of the costs promi-
sors bear when faced with legal sanctions. We might question whether
enforcing promises would either be generally welfare enhancing or
welfare diminishing within the likely specifications for these factors.
But how can we know what specifications are reasonable?
Aghion and Hermalin conclude that "the question of whether a
given set of restrictions improves or reduces efficiency is an empirical
one: only by considering variations in these restrictions over time,
across states, or across nations can one truly determine the effects of
these restrictions on efficiency."' ' Empirical analysis might shed some
light on our question. Perhaps empirical studies could show that the ef-
fects of inefficient signaling are muted for certain types of promises, or
conversely, that the likely harms from inefficient signaling are particu-
larly severe for select groups of promises. But we doubt that empirical
160 Aghion and Hermalin, 6 J L Econ & Org at 404 (cited in note 140).
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studies are capable of determining the effects of making a legally bind-
ing option available for the entire range of noncommodifiable promises.
Signaling spirals only occur among groups of promisors with simi-
lar observable characteristics. When a legally binding option is offered
to a group of promisors, this should not affect promisors with different
observable characteristics -promisors who are not part of the same
reference group. For example, if Gina promises to give Fred a car at a
future date, Fred will probably try to assess Gina's probability of per-
formance by looking to whether promisors similar to Gina fulfilled
promises of a similar nature in the past. If Gina is an elderly social
worker, and Barbara is a young shopkeeper, Fred probably will not
assess the likelihood of Gina actually delivering the car by examining
whether Barbara previously fulfilled a promise to sell bubblegum for
a dollar. Both the promisors and the promises are sufficiently dissimi-
lar in these two scenarios that they are unlikely to be part of the same
reference group.161
As such, a necessary first step to performing any empirical analy-
sis requires determining which promises are in the same reference
group. This assessment is by no means trivial. Individual promisors
may fall within multiple reference groups for different types of prom-
ises, creating an interlocking web of reference groups. And promisees
may differ about what observable characteristics they find most sali-
ent. For instance, a racist promisee might not consider promises made
by the members of a minority group as comparable to promises made
by the majority, while a nonracist promisee would lump promisors into
reference groups without looking at the color of their skin. Any pro-
misor can be viewed as having an infinite number of observable char-
acteristics, yet promisees will only take some of these characteristics
into account when making judgments about which promisors are
comparable.162 A meaningful empirical analysis would have to sort
161 As an aside, we do not actually believe that promisees assess promisors' reliability in such a
formulaic fashion. Nevertheless, we do believe that people form expectations about the likely be-
havior of others through experience and through stories of others' experiences Fred may not actu-
ally search his mind for whether promisors similar to Gina performed in the past when determining
his expectations about whether Gina will perform. But Fred's expectation about Gina's likelihood
of performance must arise from somewhere. If Fred has witnessed promisors similar to Gina
reneging on their promises in the past, he is more likely to doubt Gina's probability of perform-
ance. Signaling spirals do not take place immediately. But over time, removing some of the
members from a reference group is likely to alter promisees' expectations about the remaining
members of the group.
162 We continue to assume that promisors have limited control over their observable char-
acteristics. Or, at a minimum, that any efforts by promisors to adjust their observable characteris-
tics for signaling purposes when consideration is not available do not create significant welfare
costs. To the extent promisors invest in being viewed as responsible, these efforts might be wel-
fare enhancing. The set of behaviors likely to signal that one is a reliable promisor are generally
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through this convoluted and constantly shifting web of reference
groups in order to evaluate the magnitude of signaling costs.
In the absence of convincing empirical studies, we need a default
determination about whether to provide a legally binding option for
noncommodifiable promises. We must look beyond the models in or-
der to decide which default determination is more appropriate-
either denying enforcement to promises unbacked by consideration or
allowing all promises to be enforced.
C. Tiebreaking Factors
The standard assumption that the law should enforce parties' ex-
pressed intentions relies on the notion that these expressed intentions
represent the parties' underlying desires. But for noncommodifiable
promises, signaling spirals can lead promisors to enter a legally bind-
ing form even when they would prefer that the form not exist. Lacking
means for determining parties' true desires, we look to a number of
tiebreaking factors that support a default rule of nonenforcement.
None of these factors are particularly persuasive, at least to the extent
we have developed them here; we do not claim any of the factors
would justify ignoring parties' wishes if we could confidently ascertain
those wishes. But in the absence of a better guide for policy, these fac-
tors support a default rule of denying enforcement to promises not
backed by consideration.
For our first tiebreaking factor, we cite the administrative costs of
enforcement. Enforcing promises through the legal system creates
numerous costs. Someone must pay for the judge's salary and the sala-
ries of the other court employees. And lawyers typically take a signifi-
cant portion of the eventual judgment or settlement. Even the time
the parties invest in litigating a dispute can represent significant costs.
These costs warn against legal overreaching. When we are truly uncer-
tain about whether the law could effectively monitor a social dispute,
administrative costs form a tiebreaker justifying legal restraint.
'6
viewed as socially desirable-avoiding lying, displaying generosity, and so on. See notes 145-46
for a related discussion.
163 Moreover, administrative costs may be particularly high for noncommodiflable prom-
ises. These promises were originally made within thick social relationships where the promisors
were more concerned with the message sent by the promise than by the actual transaction. Pro-
misees will typically only sue over breaches of these promises when the relationship between the
parties has soured beyond repair. Noncommodifiable relationships are thick and infused with
meaning. When these relationships go bad and lead to litigation, the parties may pursue the
litigation without regard to its costs or economic rationality Winning the dispute may become
more important to the parties than the actual recovery; the parties may be willing to invest more
in the lawsuits than the amount of the recovery can justify. As such, the case for a default rule
against legal enforcement based on administrative costs gains additional strength for noncom-
modifiable promises. See Marc S. Galanter, Reading The Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
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As a second tiebreaking factor, we note that noncommodifiable
promises operate within a web of complex obligations. The fact that
parties cannot voice consideration for these promises suggests that
there may be other mutually understood obligations that are never
explicitly stated in a form that courts can identify.'" To enforce only
the explicitly promised obligations would risk imposing an undue bur-
den on the promisor, as her explicitly articulated obligations would
become enforceable but any unarticulated return obligations of the
promisee would remain unenforced.
Third, even ignoring the potential harm from inefficient signaling,
the welfare consequences of noncommodifiable promises may be am-
biguous. Eric Posner has discussed at length why status-enhancing and
trust-building promises are not necessarily welfare enhancing. 1  The
reason is that these promises are positional in nature. When one promi-
sor gains status, others lose status. And when promisors use gifts to
gain a promisee's trust, these gifts can raise the costs to everyone else
of gaining trust. The use of promises to gain trust or status can result
in a prisoners' dilemma problem. Promisors may find themselves giv-
ing gifts merely to retain their relative position, such that they would
be better off if everyone abstained from making status-enhancing and
trust-building promises.'66
Almost by definition, the message sent by noncommodifiable
promises is more important than the actual transfer of goods or ser-
vices. We assume that the transfer of goods or services from altruistic
and exchange-oriented promises enhances welfare because otherwise
these promises would not be made. Promisors make exchange-oriented
promises in order to gain something of value from the promisees-
something that they prefer more than the goods or services they give
up. And promisors make altruistic promises because they want the
promisees to have the promised goods or services. But we have no
reason for assuming that the actual transfer of goods or services en-
hances welfare in noncommodifiable promises. Consequently, it is
hard to generalize about whether these transfers enhance or diminish
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L Rev 4, 24-25 (1983) (arguing that most litigation occurs where "there is no antici-
pated future relationship").
164 This observation has spawned the field of transaction cost economic See generally, for
example, Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory, in Neil J.
Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds, The Handbook of Economic Sociology 77 (Princeton 1994).
165 See E. Posner, 1997 Wis L Rev at 588-91 (cited in note 130) (discussing how the signals
implicit in these sorts of promises may induce competition that is, on balance, welfare reducing).
166 Refusing to enforce these promises would not prevent parties from making trust-
building or status-enhancing gifts, But without enforceable promises, parties would at least be
prevented from making gifts larger than they can currently afford.
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welfare. When the potential costs from signaling spirals are factored
in, we might presume that enforcing these promises would generally
reduce welfare.'6'
On a related note, our fourth tiebreaking factor looks back to our
discussion of philosophy and political theory.'6Many of the arguments
supporting anticommodification norms contain value judgments. The
norms against commodification were thought to perform important
functions such as preventing the wealthy from purchasing power
within nonmarket spheres, protecting goods and relationships with
inherent dignity from being corrupted by market language and logic,
and insuring that these goods and relationships are treated with the
respect they deserve. When it is normatively inappropriate for the par-
ties to discuss a promise using cost-benefit language, do we really want
a judge or jury to assign damages for breach? Calculating damages
requires cost-benefit thinking; the promise must generally be assigned
a dollar value. '6 This is the essence of commodification. Anticommodi-
fication norms might warn against legal enforcement just as they pre-
vent the parties from explicit bargaining. "
Finally, we note that parties can always transgress anticommodifi-
cation norms and invoke the consideration doctrine if they place suffi-
cient value on having their promises enforced. Even parties operating
within norm-bound relationships sometimes hire lawyers. We do not
claim any certainty about the nature or scope of anticommodification
norms. In many contexts, promises may be characterized by mixed
motives. The parties may care about both the substance of the transac-
tion and the message sent by the transaction. By requiring only nomi-
nal consideration, our preferred version of the consideration doctrine
would provide a legally binding option for all parties who sufficiently
care about the substance of their transaction to ignore any norms
against voicing consideration. When the parties already trust one an-
other, for instance, they may find it easy to invoke consideration. But
when the parties are engaged in a delicate courtship dance with high
167 We express deep discomfort about these speculations into promises' social worth. Again,
we only resort to these substantivist arguments as a tiebreaker; we would instead look to the
parties' desires if we could confidently ascertain their desires. However, it is worth noting that
our substantivist tiebreaker argument draws a different line than the substantivist arguments we
discussed in Part I.B. We continue to believe that gratuitous promises as a class are no less valu-
able than exchange promises. Altruistic promises should generally be welfare enhancing. We
suggest only that noncommodifiable gratuitous promises-promises made for signaling purposes
such as trust or status-might lack social value.
168 See Part I.B.
169 We might avoid calculating damages by only providing the remedy of specific perform-
ance. But this would require a significant adjustment to our law of contract remedies.
170 See Eisenberg, 85 Cal L Rev 847-48 (cited in note 89), for a discussion along these lines.
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potential for misunderstandings, they may decide that the potential
gains from making a promise binding do not justify the risk of violat-
ing anticommodification norms.
In a sense, we force the parties to trade off between concerns
over inappropriate signaling and the inability to secure their promises
through law, rather than requiring courts to make these judgments. If
the parties place sufficient value on making a promise enforceable,
they can always declare that the promise is being exchanged for a
penny, even if doing so is socially awkward or risks sending an unde-
sired message. As such, when anticommodification norms deter parties
from invoking even nominal consideration, we can expect that the
parties were not overly concerned about being unable to secure their
promise through law.
Our tiebreaking factors are speculative and undertheorized. We
cannot fully develop these arguments within the space constraints of
this Article. Nevertheless, we believe the factors combine to justify a
default rule against enforcing noncommodifiable promises. When sig-
naling spirals make it impossible to determine the parties' true desires,
the tiebreaking arguments provide cause for denying the option to
have promises enforced.
V. CONCLUSION
Substantive theorists have sought to deny legal support for gra-
tuitous promises; formalist scholars have been unable to justify the use
of consideration in place of alternative forms. Our account takes a
different approach, arguing that requiring nominal consideration leads
to enforcing promises when parties actually wish to be bound. We base
our account on the roles of anticommodification norms and of ineffi-
cient signaling. What previous scholars have failed to realize is that
even nominal consideration is unavailable within certain social con-
texts. When parties are unable to articulate consideration, they will
generally also be unable to make return payments and scope adjust-
ments, creating the potential for inefficient signaling spirals that can
harm both promisors and promisees.
The consideration form can thus serve to identify contexts in
which parties are fully able to bargain over the content of their prom-
ises. What ultimately matters is not whether the parties do offer con-
sideration, but rather whether they can offer consideration. The key
question is whether social norms permit bargaining over the terms of
a promise. As such, the use of consideration language informs courts
that providing a legally binding option will benefit the contracting
parties. By voicing consideration, the parties demonstrate that their
expressed intentions correspond with their underlying desires-that
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their promise is of a type for which parties should generally desire an
option for legal enforcement.
Our account provides a framework for clearing up the morass of
existing doctrine. Many of the conflicting precedents that currently
plague the case law have arisen from courts' attempts to determine
which promises are socially valuable."' These inquiries are misguided.
When the consideration doctrine is interpreted to allow nominal con-
sideration, parties can make this determination instead of the courts.
Whenever the parties care sufficiently about having their promises
supported by law -valuing the substance of their transaction over any
messages it might send-the parties can invoke consideration. A nomi-
nal consideration requirement only denies enforcement when promises
are made within ritualized social contexts in which norms block the
use of even nominal consideration- contexts in which inefficient sig-
naling combines with tiebreaking factors so that parties would gener-
ally prefer to leave their promises nonbinding.
The consideration doctrine is not the only mechanism used for
making promises legally binding. In addition to consideration, courts
sometimes look to other doctrines like reliance. Our paper seeks only
to justify the consideration doctrine, not to provide a complete account
of all potential rules for contract formation. Indeed, our account pro-
vides strong support for enforcing promises backed by nominal consid-
eration, but it does not necessarily mean that promises lacking consid-
eration should not be enforced. The law might well benefit from using
other doctrines like reliance to supplement the consideration doctrine,
providing additional methods by which promises might be enforced.
Although our account does not completely address potential
supplements to the consideration doctrine, our discussion provides a
framework through which these supplementary approaches should be
analyzed. For instance, some states enforce promises using a seal doc-
trine even when consideration is lacking."2 By signing written state-
ments of their promises in the presence of a notary public, promisors
in these states can make even unilateral promises legally binding. To
determine the merits of this supplemental rule, future papers must
look to both inefficient signaling and to anticommodification norms.
171 See Part I.C.
172 See, for example, Jolles v Wittenberg, 148 Ga App 805,253 SE2d 203,205 (1979) ("[Any
nominal consideration recited in sealed instruments is sufficient as a matter of law."); Carpenter v
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co, 161 Me 1, 206 A2d 225,228 (1965) ("Defendant's con-
tention that there was no consideration for the latter bond must fail. The bond being under seal,
consideration is presumed."); O'Gasapian v Danielson, 284 Mass 27, 187 NE 107, 110 (1933)
("Since the assignment was under seal it was valid and irrevocable by the assignor even without
actual consideration.").
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We have assumed for the purposes of our argument that alternatives
to nominal consideration like a seal or writing requirement are less
sensitive to anticommodification norms, but this might not be the case.
Certainly, anticommodification norms block more than just the use of
bargaining. There might be circumstances in which bargaining is socially
appropriate but where going to a notary public would violate taboos.
We have argued that a nominal consideration requirement effec-
tively divides the circumstances in which inefficient signaling presents
a serious problem from circumstances in which this problem does not
occur. We believe that nominal consideration performs this role far
better than any alternative forms. Although nominal consideration is
not the only formalism entangled with anticommodification norms, no
other formalism equally signifies whether parties are able to negotiate
over more than two terms. After all, the existence of consideration
(otherwise known as return payments) is one of the additional terms
we analyze in Part IV. And the other term-scope adjustments-will
be permissible within the same general set of social scenarios as
nominal consideration. Although we are open to the use of alternative
doctrines as a supplement to our nominal consideration rule, we re-
main confident that nominal consideration should be the primary
mechanism through which promises are made legally binding.
We believe that anticommodification norms have significant im-
plications for contract formation. How courts should react to these
norms is an undertheorized question that merits further inquiry. Fu-
ture empirical studies might even demonstrate that certain sets of
promises are not subject to inefficient signaling spirals and should
thus be enforceable even without nominal consideration.'73
This paper has been dedicated to proving a single point: that
courts should enforce promises backed only by nominal consideration.
Despite the many questions our account leaves unanswered, on this
point we are certain. Courts should not create special rules to deny
legal support for interfamilial promises and the like. To the extent that
173 Yet, even here, our account would provide a framework for analyzing whether excep-
tions of this sort are valid. It is not enough to claim that exempted promises are socially valuable,
as these inquiries have been made in the past. This argument only had force against the assump-
tion that other gratuitous promises were valueless, an assumption we have shown to be mistaken.
Even if we prioritize encouraging certain promises-for example, donations to charities-above
any potential harm to promisors, this would not necessarily justify excepting these promises from
the consideration requirement. Inefficient signaling spirals can harm promisees-such as chari-
table recipients-in addition to harming promisors. Only if future empirical studies show that
inefficient signaling is unlikely for certain categories of noncommodifiable promises should we
exclude these promises from the consideration requirement. Until studies of this sort can be con-
ducted, we favor a default rule of only enforcing promises backed by at least nominal consideration.
And we continue to doubt whether it would even be possible to conduct studies of this sort.
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the relationship-oriented nature of these promises presents a problem,
anticommodification norms will deny these parties the use of nominal
consideration without the need for courts to intervene. In place of the
various substantive inquiries made by existing case law, we call for
making the existence of nominal consideration both a necessary and
sufficient condition for the use of the consideration doctrine. Our ac-
count provides courts with simpler and more coherent guidelines for
applying the consideration doctrine, and with a superior method for
determining which promises parties actually desire to have enforced.
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APPENDIX A: THE AGHION-HERMALIN MODEL OF
INEFFICIENT SIGNALING
This Appendix begins our formal proof for the problem of ineffi-
cient signaling, as discussed in Part III of the paper. Our proof relies
on a model developed by Phillippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin."
Their model shows how limitations on contractual terms can be wel-
fare enhancing.' The Aghion-Hermalin model is part of a newer form
of game theory based on asymmetric information.7 6 This branch of
scholarship first developed as part of insurance economics, but the
approach has since been applied to numerous problems in law and
economics." Nevertheless, this article is the first time a model of this
sort has been used to analyze the consideration doctrine." This Ap-
pendix proceeds in two sections: Section A shows how our question-
whether limitations should be placed on promisors' ability to legally
bind themselves-fits the conditions under which the Aghion-
Hermalin model applies. Section B explains the model's implications
through a series of graphs.
174 See Aghion and Hermalin, 9 J L Econ & Org at 381-98 (cited in note 140).
175 The authors' paradigmatic case involves an entrepreneur raising capital for a project. Id.
Their paper shows the possibility of efficiency gains from limitations on the amount the entre-
preneur can be forced to pay in the case of default, essentially justifying bankruptcy laws. Id at
400-01. The authors also discuss how their model can be applied to limitations on penalties for
breach of contract and to mandated benefits in employment contracts. In a separate paper, Ian
Ayres has used their model to discuss possible inefficiencies in corporate contracting. See gener-
ally Ayres, 60 U Cin L Rev at 392-402 (cited in note 149). We draw upon Ayres's work in seeking
to present a simplified description of the Aghion-Hermalin model.
176 See Aghion and Hermalin, 9 J L Econ & Org at 387-92 (cited in note 140). Aghion and
Hermalin base their work on an extensive body of scholarship. In addition to the Rothschild and
Stiglitz piece previously mentioned, 90 Q J Econ 629 (cited in note 141), noteworthy works in-
clude George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970), and A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355(1973) (discussing effects of signaling on infrequent market participants). In 2001, Akerlof,
Spence, and Stiglitz jointly won the Nobel Prize for their work on asymmetric information and
signaling. Although our analysis relies on papers by these authors and others, we do not discuss all
of our debts. Suffice it to say that both the Aghion-Hermalin model and our own extension of that
model stand on a mountain of previous economics scholarship.
177 Ian Ayres describes some of the ways in which this scholarship has been applied to legal
problems in Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 Stan L Rev 1291 (1990).
178 Eric Posner discusses the Aghion-Hermalin model in his recent essay Economic Analysis
of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 Yale L J at 860-61 (cited in note 3).
Posner indicts the model as a descriptive and normative failure, but never considers its potential
utility in resolving the puzzle of how to justify modem contract doctrine's refusal to enforce
promises where promisors clearly intended the contract to be enforced. Id at 849-51. He con-
cludes his discussion of the consideration doctrine by supporting our premise that existing schol-
arship has failed to justify the doctrine's refusal to enforce promises where promisors clearly
intended the contract to be enforced. Id at 850-51.
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A. Six Conditions under Which the Model Applies
Space constraints prevent us from formally elaborating the
Aghion-Hermalin model. 9 Fortunately, Aghion and Hermalin prove
that their results hold whenever six conditions apply. "° The conditions
are as follows: First, there must be "opposite preferences over the con-
tract terms." Second, both promisors and promisees must have "con-
vex preferences over the terms of the contract." Third, the different
types of promisors must systematically differ with regard to the "mar-
ginal rate of substitution between the terms of the contract." Fourth,
promisors must have "private information" that "cannot be contracted
on." Fifth, promisors must have "bargaining power.' '8' And sixth, the
terms of the contract must lie on a continuous spectrum."
The first five conditions clearly apply to our question- whether
limiting the availability of a legally binding form can enhance welfare.
Only the sixth condition is questionable.
The first condition is easily met; promisors and promisees have
opposite preferences for both contracting terms. Holding the benefit
the promisor expects to obtain from promising constant, promisors
prefer to obtain this benefit using the lowest possible values for both
the size of the promise and the level of sanctions, while promisees pre-
fer higher values for these terms. ' As such, promisors have cost and
value curves that work in opposite directions. The higher promisors set
the terms, the more the promisees benefit, and the more the promisors
can receive in return for making the promise. ' Yet raising the terms
increases the costs of making the promise. Promisors should thus
179 The model fills twenty-nine pages of an economics journal and relies on a level of
mathematical complexity beyond the expertise of most readers of law journals.
180 See Aghion and Hermalin, 6 J L Econ & Org at 398 (cited in note 140).
181 Id.
182 Id at 384. Following standard economic practice, Aghion and Hermalin assume that their
contract terms are continuous. As such, they do not discuss this assumption when generalizing
their results. Also following standard economic practice, they assume their terms can be repre-
sented by twice-differentiable von Neumann-Morgernstern utility functions. Id.
183 Promisees prefer higher levels of sanctions first because sanctions make it costly for the
promisor to renege and thus increase the probability of performance and second because -in the
case of legal damages-some portion of the sanctions are paid by the promisor to the promisee.
184 To see why this is the case, we must return to the four types of promises described in
Part II.C of the paper. For all four types of promises, the value the promisors receive from mak-
ing the promise depends on the benefit conferred on promisees. In the case of exchange-oriented
and trust-building promises, the more promisors offer, the more promisees should be willing to
give in return-whether in the form of a defined exchange or undefined goodwill. Similarly, large
status-enhancing promises generate more status than do small status-enhancing promises. And
altruistic promisors benefit directly from the value conferred on promisees due to interdependent
utility. Thus, regardless of a promisor's motivation, the benefit a promisor receives from making a
promise partially depends on the size of the promise -the benefit conferred on the promisee.
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choose the combination of terms that generates the maximum value at
the minimum cost.
Moving to the second condition, the parties should have convex
preferences over the terms of the contract. Convex preferences come
from risk aversion. Risk aversion is a standard assumption in eco-
nomic models and is thought to originate from the decreasing mar-
ginal utility of money. Like most economic actors, promisors and
promisees are generally regarded as risk averse.
The third condition requires that promisors differ in their will-
ingness to trade off between the two terms. This condition holds be-
cause promisors have varying probabilities of performance. For any
fixed level of benefit, reliable promisors should be more willing to
increase their level of sanctions while reducing the size of their prom-
ise than are unreliable promisors.
The fourth and fifth conditions require that promisors have pri-
vate information and can exercise market power. These conditions
follow from our assumption of asymmetric information and our use of
the offer-acceptance model, respectively. '8
Finally, we assume that the sixth condition holds for the purposes
of this Appendix. The sixth condition demands that both contracting
terms fall along a continuous spectrum. In other words, promisors
must be able to gradually increase or decrease both the size of their
promises and the level of sanctions rather than being forced to choose
between discrete options.
The size of a promise probably does fall along a continuous spec-
trum in most cases. A promisor might increase the magnitude of a
promise by pledging to transfer a larger quantity of goods or services.
When the quantity cannot be altered, a promisor might still increase the
size of the promise by delivering the goods or services at an earlier point
in time or otherwise making the promise more desirable to the promisee.
In contrast, we have doubts about whether the level of sanctions
falls along a continuous spectrum. In many cases, promisors may be
stuck with the discrete choice between offering either a set level of
sanctions corresponding with social stigma or else a set level of sanc-
tions resulting from legal damages. Nevertheless, we assume that the
185 But see Matthew Rabin, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk
Aversion, in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, eds, Choices, Values, and Frames 202, 207-08
(Cambridge 2000). Instead, Rabin claims risk aversion is a result of cognitive biases related to
the endowment effect. Id.
186 There are circumstances under which a promisee can have market power rather than the
promisor-such as if the promisor is a supplier to a monopsonist buyer. But as a general rule,
promisors should have market power as long as they design their promises as in the of-
fer-acceptance model.
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level of sanctions falls on a continuous spectrum for the purposes of
this Appendix.'a For balance, we adopt the opposite assumption when
creating our own model in Appendix B.
Although we assume that the level of sanctions falls on a con-
tinuous spectrum, there is still a limit to the maximum level of sanc-
tions. This limit can either be set by the promisor's wealth- promisors
cannot pay more in damages than they own-or else by law. Where
the consideration doctrine prevents parties from making their prom-
ises binding, such as for many gratuitous promises, the maximum level
of sanctions corresponds with the highest possible amount of social
stigma. Where the consideration doctrine allows parties to secure their
promises through law, such as for most exchanges and for when courts
enforce gratuitous promises backed by only nominal consideration,
the maximum level of sanctions corresponds with the highest possible
amount of legal damages. The level of sanctions is still continuous, as a
promisor can set the sanctions at any level up to the maximum limit.
But there exists a maximum level of sanctions which can be altered by
changing the law.
Consequently, all six assumptions can be said to hold for the
question of whether allowing a legally binding option might reduce
welfare. As such, the Aghion-Hermalin model can be used to analyze
the consideration doctrine.
B. Explaining the Model's Implications
Since all six conditions can be said to apply, Aghion and Herma-
lin's conclusions hold for our question. Limiting the availability of a
legally binding form can increase welfare; the mere fact that parties
choose to employ a legally binding option does not indicate that they
benefit from the existence of that option. The logic behind this conclu-
sion is best demonstrated through a series of graphs. Readers desiring
more formal substantiation of these results should refer to Aghion
and Hermalin's article.'9
187 This assumption is not entirely implausible. The potential for stigma might be increased
by pledging publicly or by invoking a religious or culturally significant symbol to secure the
promise. For instance, swearing to God or on a Bible might have more serious social conse-
quences than a promise unbacked by any religious symbolism. Where the law permits the use of
liquidated damages clauses, parties can set the amount of legal sanctions at any level they like. Still,
there are natural limits to the level of stigma-related damages, and liquidated damages clauses are
often unavailable due to either legal or practical limitations. See note 198 for further discussion.
188 Allowing an option for legal enforcement increases the maximum level of sanctions
above stigma levels. For enforceable promises, allowing liquidated damages clauses can increase
the maximum level of sanctions. Striking down unreasonably high liquidated damages clauses
limits the maximum level of legal sanctions.
189 Aghion and Hermalin, 6 J L Econ & Org 381 (cited in note 140).
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FIGURE 2: COST CURVES FIGURE 3: VALUE CURVES
Size of Size of Vu
Promise Promise
VP
CR VR
Level of Sanctions Level of Sanctions
Figure 2 shows how promisors value the tradeoffs between the
costs associated with the size of a promise and the level of sanctions.
CR depicts the cost tradeoff curve of a reliable promisor. Cu shows the
cost tradeoff curve of a promisor with a lower probability of perform-
ance an "unreliable" promisor. As the reliable promisor knows that she
is less likely to default, she will be more willing to accept a high level
of sanctions than will the unreliable promisor. Locations on the
southwest portion of the graph correspond with lower costs for promi-
sors than do locations to the northeast.
Figure 3 shows the combinations of the two terms capable of pro-
ducing the same level of value for the promisors-in other words, the
promisors' indifference curves or value curves. Since the value received
by promisors is related to the benefit conferred on promisees, and since
promisees prefer larger-sized promises and higher levels of sanctions,
the level of value increases toward the northeast comer of the graph.
The value a promisor receives from making a promise also de-
pends on her perceived reliability. Value curve VR depicts the mix of
terms a promisor can offer in exchange for a specified level of value if
she is viewed as a reliable type. Value curve VU shows the mix of terms
required to produce the same level of value if the promisor is per-
ceived as an unreliable type. Promisors perceived as unreliable need
to offer a higher mixture of the two terms in order to derive the same
value as promisors perceived as reliable types; hence, curve VU lies to
the northeast of curve VR.'O Whether a promisor needs to offer the
190 Promisors perceived as unreliable also need to include a relatively higher level of sanc-
tions in order to make their promises seem credible. As such, the value curve of the unreliable
type promisor is more steeply sloped than the value curve of the reliable type promisor.
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terms described by VR or V, depends on the promisor's perceived reli-
ability, not her actual reliability. '91 V, shows the pooled value curve -
the set of combinations of the two terms capable of producing the
given level of value when it is impossible to tell whether the promisor
is a reliable or unreliable type.92
FIGURE 4: POOLED EQUILIBRIUM
Size
of
Promise
Level of Sanctions Maximum
Sanction
Figure 4 combines the cost and value curves to show a possible
equilibrium for the terms chosen by the two promisors. Point A repre-
sents the spot along the pooled value curve where the reliable-type
promisor can derive the specified level of value with the minimal cost.
Without any ability to distinguish herself from unreliable promisors, a
191 Again, the amount promisees offer in exchange for a promise depends on the promisor's
perceived reliability, not actual reliability.
192 The slope of the pooled indifference curve must lie somewhere between the slope of the
indifference curves for the reliable and unreliable type promisors. The exact placement of the
pooled curve depends on the relative numbers of reliable and unreliable type promisors in the
overall population.
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reliable promisor would select point A. Since unreliable promisors
wish to be seen as reliable, they would also pick point A in order to
avoid signaling their greater probability of default.
However, reliable promisors face incentives to signal their greater
reliability through their choice of terms. For instance, reliable promi-
sors might try to offer point C in order to differentiate their promises
from those of the unreliable promisors. If a reliable promisor could
successfully communicate her type, offering point C would allow her
to achieve the same value previously gained by point A, but at a lower
cost. In contrast, since the unreliable promisors have a steeper cost
curve, offering point C would raise their costs as compared to point A.
Thus, we might think that that choosing point C would demonstrate
that a promisor is of the reliable type.
Yet, once the reliable promisors offer point C, unreliable promi-
sors will no longer have the option of promising point A. Choosing
anything other than point C would reveal that a promisor is unreliable.
Instead, unreliable promisors must either follow the reliable promisors
in offering point C or else offer point B-the minimum cost for achiev-
ing the specified level of value along the unreliable promisor value
curve. Point B corresponds to the cost curve Cu . Since point C lies to
the southwest of Cu., the unreliable promisors will follow the reliable
ones in offering point C.
Once the unreliable promisors begin offering point C, the reliable
promisors can no longer achieve the specified level of value by picking
a point on the curve VR. Instead, they must select a point along the
pooled value curve Vp. Moreover, the reliable promisors no longer
have point A available as an option. Any promisor who picks point
A-regardless of their actual reliability-will be perceived as unreli-
able and will thus be unable to achieve the level of value associated
with the pooled value line Vp. The only options available are locations
to the right of point C along the pooled value line Vp, or else points
along the unreliable promisor value line Vu. The reliable promisors
thus face incentives to continue increasing their level of sanctions in
order to signal their difference from the unreliable promisors. The
unreliable promisors will continue following the reliable ones by also
raising the level of sanctions they offer. This process continues until
both types of promisors reach the maximum level of sanctions. Conse-
quently, both types of promisors end up offering point D, where the
maximum level of sanctions intersects the pooled value curve Vp.
The pooled equilibrium at point D is not an efficient outcome.
Both reliable and unreliable promisors would face lower costs and
achieve the same benefit by offering promises at point A. Assuming
the value curves correspond with the benefit derived by promisees, the
promisees should be indifferent between receiving promises at point
1374 [73:1299
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A or point D. As such, moving to point A would represent a Pareto
improvement over the pooled equilibrium at point D. Both types of
promisors would be better off if the promises were made at point A,
while the promisees would not be harmed.
A pooled equilibrium is not the only possible outcome for the
signaling game. Figure 5 shows how the game can generate a separat-
ing equilibrium. The slopes of the cost curves have been adjusted from
those in Figure 3 in order to produce the new outcome. In Figure 5,
the reliable promisors can offer point E and thus signal their greater
probability of performance. Point E lies just to the right of the unreli-
able promisor cost curve Cu, so the unreliable promisors will prefer to
offer point B along their own value curve rather than following the
reliable promisors in offering point E. Having signaled their differ-
ence from the unreliable promisors, the reliable promisors are able to
offer point E along the reliable promisor value line instead of being
forced to use the pooled value line.
FIGURE 5: SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM
Size
of
Promise
E
Level of Sanctions Maximum
Sanction
Like the pooled equilibrium in Figure 4, the separating equilib-
rium depicted in Figure 5 is not an efficient outcome. Both reliable
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and unreliable promisors would face lower costs by offering promises
at point A as opposed to their respective outcomes at points E and B.
Assuming the value curves correspond with the benefit derived by
promisees, the promisees as a group should be indifferent between
receiving promises at point A from both types of promisors or receiv-
ing promises from the reliable promisors at point E and from the un-
reliable ones at point B. As such, a pooled equilibrium at point A
would represent a near-Pareto improvement over the separating equi-
librium at points B and E.'"
Why then don't the reliable promisors just stick with offering
promises at point A rather than moving to point E? Because the reli-
able promisors do not actually have the choice between offering
promises at point A or at point E. From a starting place of point A,
reliable promisors face incentives to instead offer point C. Once the
unreliable promisors follow the reliable types in offering point C,
point A is no longer available. Any promise made at point A would be
seen as coming from an unreliable promisor. Continuing their at-
tempts to signal their greater reliability, reliable promisors will offer
promises further to the right along the reliable promisor value curve
VR. Unreliable promisors will follow these signals until the reliable
promisors end up offering point E, at which time it becomes prefer-
able for the unreliable promisors to offer point B along their own
value curve. Any reliable promisors who sought to depart from the
new equilibrium outcome by offering a promise to the left of point E
would be viewed as unreliable and would thus need to offer a promise
along the unreliable promisor value curve. Once again, the signaling
process ends up harming both types of promisors.
These inefficient outcomes can be prevented by setting the maxi-
mum sanctions at the appropriate level."' Figure 6 shows how the
promisors from Figure 5 could benefit by a reduction in the maximum
level of legal sanctions."' With the maximum allowable sanctions set so
193 The pooled outcome represents only a near-Pareto improvement rather than an actual
Pareto improvement because it has different distributional implications for individual promisees
within the larger group.
194 Pooled equilibria like those depicted in Figure 4 can always be made more efficient by
setting the maximum level of sanctions at an appropriate level. This result comes partially from
the fact that pooled equilibria can only result from a maximum level of sanctions Were sanctions
unlimited-either by the law or by promisors' wealth-a separating equilibrium would always
result. However, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium that cannot be made more
efficient by imposing a maximum level of legal sanctions. See Aghion and Hermalin, 6 J L Econ
& Org at 397 (cited in note 140).
195 It is easy to see how the same result can be reached for the promisors in the pooled
equilibrium from Figure 4. The separating equilibrium in Figure 5 can be transformed into a
pooled equilibrium by shifting the level of maximum sanctions to the left of where curve C,
intersects curve VR. This would cause both types of promisors to promise where the new maxi-
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as to intersect point A, reliable promisors will be unable to signal by
increasing their choice of sanctions above the level of point A. Conse-
quently, both reliable and unreliable promisors will promise at Point
A, thus improving the welfare of both types of promisors.
FIGURE 6: OPTIMAL SANCTIONS
Size
of
Promise
A
Level of Sanctions
Maximum
Sanction
The Aghion-Hermalin model shows how a limit on the maximum
level of legal sanctions can enhance welfare. By limiting the sanctions
that a promisor can offer in the event of breach, the law can prevent
inefficient signaling. As Aghion and Hermalin summarize their findings:
Parties to a contract may enter into inefficient contracts because of
asymmetric information. Under asymmetric information, a con-
tract plays two roles. First, it sets the terms of trade, and, second, it
can reveal private information. As it is the first role that deter-
mines the efficiency of a contract, the second role can lead to inef-
mum sanctions line intersected curve VR. Since this result is less efficient than pooling at point A,
further reducing the level of maximum sanctions would thus benefit both types of promisors.
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ficiency. Restrictions on contracts can increase efficiency if they
limit the signaling role without affecting the terms of trade role. '9
However, just because a limit on sanctions can improve welfare
does not mean that it does improve welfare. Without knowing the
slopes of promisor cost and value curves, we cannot know the appro-
priate setting for the maximum level of legal sanctions. The considera-
tion doctrine might reduce sanctions to an inefficiently low level.
FIGURE 7: INEFFICIENTLY Low SANCTIONS
C\
vu
Maximum
Sanction
Level of Sanctions
Figure 7 shows the consequences of setting the maximum level of
legal sanctions too low. Instead of creating a pooled equilibrium at
point A, promisors are limited to the level of sanctions associated with
point F Hence, point F represents the new pooled equilibrium out-
come. Since point F lies to the northeast of the cost curves both pro-
196 Aghion and Hermalin, 6 J L Econ & Org at 403 (cited in note 140).
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misors would have faced had they been able to offer point A, point F
is an inefficient outcome. Allowing promisors to offer point A would
create a Pareto improvement enhancing the welfare of both types of
promisors without harming promisees.
The maximum level of legal sanctions can be set too high or too
low. Either result diminishes welfare. The question, then, is how to set
sanctions at the appropriate level. Are parties made better off when
they can back their promises by legal damages, or would welfare be
enhanced by limiting them to the damages corresponding with social
stigma? As noted in Part III, our formal models cannot answer this
question.' ' But the Aghion-Hermalin model can-and does- disprove
the current paradigm of assuming that parties who utilize a legally
binding option necessarily benefit from the existence of that option.
197 See note 148 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX B: AN EXTENSION OF THE AGHION-HERMALIN MODEL
This Appendix concludes our formal proof for the problem of in-
efficient signaling, as discussed in Part III of the paper and in Appen-
dix A. The Aghion-Hermalin model described in Appendix A proves
that the mere fact that parties employ a legally binding form should
not be taken as evidence that the parties desire the existence of that
form. Parties may be made better off when denied the option to back
their promises with legal damages. Nevertheless, the Aghion-Hermalin
model tells our story imperfectly. Since the model uses only two types
of promisors, it cannot fully demonstrate how a legally binding form
can create a negative spiral harming larger groups of promisors and
promisees. Crucially, the model does not provide any means for show-
ing how the imposition of a legally binding option affects promisees.
Moreover, the model's assumption that damages fall on a continuous
scale departs from our intuitions about promises and contracts. Parties
may often have only two options for damages-either a fixed amount
of stigma if the promise is not legally binding, or else a set level of le-
gal damages if the promise is backed by law."
Consequently, we have extended Aghion and Hermalin's work to
develop our own model. Our model uses four types of promisors and
allows only two options for remedies-either stigma-related penalties
or full expectation damages. We have kept our model significantly less
formal than Aghion and Hermalin's in order to fit its analysis within
the space constraints of this Article. Nevertheless, our model does rest
on a few simple equations.
To begin elaborating our model, we need to define a few terms.
Let X measure the size of a promise. And let P, measure a promisor's
probability of breach (for promisors i equals one through four). We
use Pavg to indicate the average probability of breach for all promisors
198 In theory, promisors can use liquidated damages clauses to set legal sanctions at any
level they like. Yet practical considerations often prevent the use of liquidated damages clauses.
Current doctrine places limits on the use of these clauses, frequently ignoring the clauses in favor
of expectation damages. See generally, for example, Wasserman's Inc v Township of Middletown,
137 NJ 238,645 A2d 100 (1994) (expounding the doctrine that liquidated damages provisions are
unenforceable when they are a penalty). Even when the courts do enforce these clauses, con-
tracting parties may find it difficult to agree upon a specified amount of damages at contract
formation. Consequently, parties often have only a single choice for the level of legal damages.
Similarly, parties often have little control over the damages of social stigma. Parties may some-
times be able to alter stigma-related damages by making their promises more or less publicly, but
it is hard to negotiate publicity. Regardless of what the parties agree on, promisees face incen-
tives to later publicize the promise in order to deter breach. Hence, parties may often have only
two options for damages-either a set level of legal damages or a set level of stigma damages.
When legal enforcement is not available, parties may not have any choice regarding the level of
sanctions, with the set level of stigma damages being their only option.
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who do not employ the legally binding form, assuming an equal per-
centage of each type of promisor within the overall population. Hence,
P a also refers to the perceived likelihood of breach for promisors not
using the legally enforceable option.'"
Using the constant R as a placeholder coefficient, we express the
benefit promisors receive from making a promise as: (1-P )RX.
Looking back to our discussions of the benefit promisors receive from
promising, recall that promisor benefit increases with the size of the
promise (X),2 0 but is discounted by the promisor's perceived reliability
(1pj201
Of course, there are costs to fulfilling a promise. These costs are
discounted by the promisor's actual probability of performance, rather
than perceived probability of performance, since the costs are only
incurred if the promise is fulfilled. The costs of completing a promise
can thus be expressed as: (1-P,)XE. The E exponent is used so that
costs increase faster than benefits. Without the use of an exponent,
either all promises would be infinitely sized or else no promises would
be made. The use of an exponent also captures the intuition that there
are increasing marginal costs to making promises larger in size.
Finally, promisors also face stigma-related costs in the event of
breach. Using the constant S as a coefficient for the impact of stigma,
these costs can be expressed as: (P,)SX.
Combining the terms, we can calculate the total welfare a promi-
sor expects to receive from making a nonlegally binding promise as:m
Promisor Welfare (not bound) = (1-P )RX- (1-P )X - (P )SX (A)
Through the use of a legally binding form, a promisor can essen-
tially reduce both her perceived probability of breach (Pjv) and actual
probability of breach (P1) to zero, insofar as they affect the first two
199 The reason follows from our specification that perceived reliability comes from the
average reliability of all promisors with similar observable characteristics. Any promisors with
distinctive observable characteristics would be excluded from our pool.
200 See note 182 and accompanying text.
201 See notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
202 The first term corresponds with the promisor's value curves-Figure 2 in Appendix A. The
second and third terms combine to form the promisor's cost curves-Figure 3 in Appendix A.
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terms.0' As such, the welfare promisors derive from making binding
promises can be expressed as:2
Promisor Welfare (bound) = RX- XE - (Pi)(S+D)X (B)
The first two terms come directly from Equation A above. The
simplification results from setting both Pi and P , to zero. The final
term comes from adding the costs of legal damages, D, to the costs
associated with stigma in the case where the promisor is unable to
perform. Despite being bound, circumstances may prevent the promi-
sor from fulfilling the promise in the manner originally intended.20 The
constant D captures any additional costs- beyond stigma-that legal
sanctions impose on the promisor over the costs that would have been
incurred were she able to perform."6
In order to calculate the welfare received by promisees, we need
to introduce the placeholder constants H, L, and V. V acts as a coeffi-
cient on the value promisees receive from a fulfilled promise. H re-
lates to the harm promisees suffer from relying on a nonlegally bind-
ing promise that is breached. For promises that are legally binding, L
measures the legal costs associated with forcing the promisor to pay
damages. , As such, we can express the welfare promisees receivefrom nonbinding and binding promises, respectively, as:
Promisee Welfare (not bound) = (1-P.)VX- P,(HX) (C)
Promisee Welfare (bound) = VX - P(LX) (D)
203 The remedy of expectation damages means that even in the event of breach the promisor
must still confer a benefit to the promisee equivalent to that originally promised. Hence, P and P,
become zero for the first two terms. Any difference between the costs incurred in paying these
damages and the actual costs of performance is measured by the constant D. P, does not become
zero in the third term, as promisors are only subject to stigma and legal damages in the case of breach.
204 Although we label the equations as referring to actual welfare for simplicity and brevity,
all four equations actually refer to expected welfare.
205 While impossibility can sometimes be used as a defense excusing nonperformance, it is
easy to imagine circumstances that fall short of impossibility but that would still cause a sincere
promisor to breach.
206 D can be negative if the cost of legal sanctions is less than the originally anticipated cost
of performance or if stigma is less burdensome in the legally binding scenario than in the un-
bound scenario. D essentially acts as a composite term for any differences in the costs associated
with breach when a promisor is legally bound than when the promisor is not bound.
207 L also includes any other differences between the value that the promisee receives from
legal sanctions and the value the promisee would receive had the promisor performed faithfully.
As with D, L is a composite term and can be negative.
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Using these equations, we can model the welfare consequences of
introducing a legally binding form. Whether allowing the option for
legal enforcement enhances or diminishes overall welfare depends on
the settings for the constants and on the promisors' probabilities of
breach. Just as the results of the Aghion-Hermalin model depend on
the slopes for the promisors' cost and value curves, the results of our
model depend on the settings for the terms used to calculate the par-
ties' costs and values.
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Figure 8 shows the model's results when P,=(5 percent, 10 per-
cent, 15 percent, 20 percent), E=2, V=15, H=2, L=5, C=2, S=20, and
D=24. X is set at 10 in the absence of a legally binding option, and is
derived from the above equations when promises can be made legally
209binding.m R is derived and then used as a constant.
208 Although the promisors initially make promises of the same size, they may alter the size
of their promises when faced with the costs associated with making their promises legally bind-
ing. Unlike in the Aghion-Hermalin model, signaling is not an issue once promisors enter the
legally binding form. The only signal that can be sent is to use the form.
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The first column in Figure 8 shows the welfare received by each
promisor and promisee in the absence of a legally binding option. The
numbers in the parentheses next to the values for promisor welfare
depict the welfare each promisor would receive were she to employ a
legally binding form. Hence, once such a form is introduced, Promisor
One should choose to bind herself because doing so increases her wel-
fare from 95 to 107. None of the other promisors immediately bind
themselves, as doing so would reduce their welfare.
Yet after Promisor One chooses to bind herself, she is no longer
included in the pool used to calculate P g. The second column shows
the welfare Promisors Two through Four-and their respective pro-
misees- would receive from making nonlegally binding promises sub-
ject to the higher value for P ,. Even though Promisor Two received
more welfare from making a nonbinding promise while Promisor One
remained part of the pool (with a potential welfare of 90 for a non-
binding promise and 85 for a binding promise), with Promisor One
removed from the pool, Promisor Two can gain more welfare from
exercising the legally binding option (with a potential welfare of 84 for
the nonbinding promise and 85 for the binding promise). Hence, Pro-
misor Two follows Promisor One in utilizing the legally binding form,
and P g increases yet again as we move to the final column.
Promisors Three and Four still gain more welfare from abstaining
from the legally binding form, making Column 3 our final outcome.
Both the overall group of promisors and the overall group of pro-
misees lose welfare from the introduction of the legally binding op-
tion. Total promisor welfare drops from 350 to 335 and total promisee
welfare drops from 515 to 510 as we move from Column 1 to Column
3 .2 ' Although Promisor One and her associated promisee benefit from
the legally binding option, their gains are overwhelmed by the losses
suffered by the other promisors and promisees. 1 Overall welfare is
maximized by not allowing promisors the option of securing their
promises through law
The level for X is calculated by taking the derivative of the equation for promisor value with
respect to X, setting the derivative equal to zero, and then solving for X. This method calculates
the setting for X which produces the maximum benefit for promisors-the setting that would be
chosen by an economically rational promisor.
209 R equals approximately 23 in the calculations behind both Figure 8 and Figure 9 below. The
level of R is calculated so that X remains the same across all four promisors in the unbound scenario.
210 Although promisees benefit from being paid legal damages, this benefit is overwhelmed
by the losses they suffer as promisors decrease the size of their promises in response to the cost
of possibly needing to pay the damages. If promisors refrained from promising all together,
rather than just decreasing the size of their promises, these losses might be even more severe.
211 Promisee Two also gains, even though Promisor Two does not.
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Figure 9 shows how a legally binding form can enhance welfare
with the constants specified differently. The only difference between
the calculations underlying Figures 8 and 9 is that D is set at 24 in Fig-
ure 8 and at 10 in Figure 9. Consequently, the promisors in Figure 9
suffer relatively smaller losses from the need to pay legal sanctions in
the case of breach as compared to the promisors in Figure 8. This re-
duced value for D is sufficient to alter the results so that the introduc-
tion of a legally binding option enhances welfare.
All four promisors choose to bind themselves in Figure 9. First,
Promisors One and Two bind themselves, moving us to Column 2.
Even though Promisor Three faced incentives to refrain from using
the legally binding form while Promisors One and Two remained part
of the pool, the reduced value for Pg- in Column 2 leads Promisor
Three to bind herself as well. With all of the other promisors bound in
Column 3, Promisor Four also binds herself to generate the outcome in
the last column. Despite the fact that Promisors Three and Four lose
welfare from the introduction of the legally binding form, the overall
group of promisors increases its welfare from 350 to 368 and the overall
group of promisees increases its welfare from 515 to 550. In contrast to
Figure 8, allowing a legally binding option enhances welfare.
Of course, these figures depict only two possible settings for the
constants. By adjusting the constants, we can create numerous alterna-
tive scenarios. Some scenarios will show that the introduction of a le-
gally binding form enhances welfare, while other scenarios will show
welfare losses coming from allowing the form. The question remains
whether parties are better off when they can back their promises with
legal damages or when they are limited to the damages created by
social stigma. As stated in Part III of the paper, our formal models
cannot answer this question."' We lack the empirical information
needed to determine reasonable values for the constants; and slight
adjustments to the constants can switch the results over a wide range
of possible settings.13 As with Aghion and Hermalin's work in Appen-
dix A, our model can only disprove the dominant wisdom that parties
who take advantage of a legally binding option necessarily desire the
existence of that option.
212 See note 148 and text accompanying note 142.
213 We encourage readers to play with the model's specifications in order to demonstrate
this fact for themselves. We will happily send an Excel spreadsheet which can be used to calcu-
late the model's results for different settings of the constants to any reader who requests it.
13852006]
Fm--ft-I
